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Chief Justice Traynor and Choice of
Law Theory
By HERMA HILL KAY*
Chief Justice Roger J. Traynor's contributions to the field of con-
flict of laws have been widely recognized. His opinions as a member of
the California Supreme Court from 1942 to 1961 were analyzed in ex-
tensive detail by Professor Brainerd Currie over twenty years ago.'
Other commentators have also called attention to the significance of
Traynor's work in this field.2 Traynor's last choice of law opinion,
Reich v. Purcell,3 was the subject of an academic symposium, 4 and par-
ticipants in the Round Table on Conflict of Laws held at the 1962
meeting of the Association of American Law Schools discussed Tray-
nor's accomplishments.5 In my view, Traynor's retirement from the
California Supreme Court in 1970 marked the beginning of a decline in
the clarity and precision of that court's choice of law opinions, which in
turn has stimulated confusion in the lower California courts. 6
Traynor broke new ground in many areas of the conflict of laws,
including jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, 7 the recognition of
sister state judgments," and interstate child custody disputes.9 His in-
* Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. B.A., 1956, Southern Meth-
odist University; J.D., 1959, University of Chicago.
1. Currie, Justice Traynor and the Conflict ofLaws, 13 STAN. L. REv. 719 (1961) [here-
inafter cited as Currie, Justice Traynor].
2. E.g., Horowitz, The Law of Choice of Law in California-4 Restatement, 21 UCLA
L. REV. 719 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Horowitz, Restatement]; Kay, Conflict ofLaws: For-
eign Law as Datum, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 47 (1965); Ratner, Reflections of a Traynor Law
Clerk- ith Some Emphasis On Conflict of Laws, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 876A (1971).
3. 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967).
4. Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 UCLA L. REV. 551 (1968).
5. See infra note 186.
6. Kay, The Use Of Comparative Impairment To Resolve True Conflicts- An Evaluation
ofthe California Experience, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 576 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Kay, Compar-
ative Impairment].
7. Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), appeal dismissed
and cert. denied sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958).
Atkinson anticipated the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186 (1977), by twenty years.
8. Elkind v. Byck, 68 Cal. 2d 453, 439 P.2d 316, 67 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1968); Worthley v.
Worthley, 44 Cal. 2d 465, 283 P.2d 19 (1955). Cf Rozan v. Rozan, 49 Cal. 2d 322, 317 P.2d
fluence was greatest, however, in the development of choice of law the-
ory. Here, Traynor's name has been associated with that of Currie and
the governmental interest analysis that Currie advocated.10 Several
writers have noted Traynor's judicial reliance upon Currie's academic
theories."l Indeed, Traynor himself stated, in an article written six
years after his retirement from the California Supreme Court, that he
"came to rely most heavily on Professor Brainerd Currie's interest
analysis, with some modification and amplification"' 2 in his choice of
law opinions.
But the story of Roger Traynor's interaction with Brainerd Currie
is not a tale of a respected and influential jurist who came to proselytize
the controversial views of a brilliant academic among his judicial col-
leagues. Rather, the story bears the traces of a collaboration between
giantsl 3-a creative intellectual colleagueship that was deepened by
strong personal friendship. 14 The narrative also contains a darker mo-
tif: the academic rivalry between Currie and Professor Albert A.
Ehrenzweig. Both advocated new approaches to choice of law theory
that were fundamentally different in conception, 5 but similar enough
in presentation to be classified together as forum-oriented ap-
proaches. 16 Traynor and Ehrenzweig were also friends, as the latter
11 (1957) (holding that a court with the parties before it can compel a land conveyance in
the form required by the law of the situs, and the conveyance will be recognized there).
9. Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948).
10. B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963) [hereinafter cited
as B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS].
11. E.g., G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 304 (1976); Barrett, Master
of Judicial Wisdom, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1060, 1063 (1983).
12. Traynor, War and Peace in the Conflict of Laws, 25 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 121, 123
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Traynor, War and Peace].
13. I have touched on this theme in Kay, Theory Into Practice: Choice of Law in the
Courts, 34 MERCER L. REv. 521, 540-42 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Kay, Theory Into
Practice].
14. Traynor, In Memoriam: Brainerd Currie, 1966 DUKE L.J. 9 [hereinafter cited as
Traynor, In Memoriam].
15. A concise statement of Ehrenzweig's approach appears in Ehrenzweig, A Proper
Law in a Proper Forum: A "Restatement" ofthe "Lex ForiApproach," 18 OKLA. L. REV. 340
(1965). A discussion and comparison of the two approaches appears in E. SCOLES & P. HAY,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 16-23 (1982).
16. E.g., R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 218-19 (1968); Leflar, Book Review,
16 STAN. L. REv. 234 (1963) (reviewing A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1962)).
Actually the contributions of the two scholars to the work of nearly all practicing
lawyers and judges and of most law school students taking the conflicts course will
be substantially similar, since most of these "men with the hoe" will not be seeking
ultimate truth but only temporary guidance along a few limited rows of growth.
For them, the guidance furnished by the two philosophers will be about the same,
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had joined the law faculty of the University of California, Berkeley,
eight years after Traynor left to assume his judicial seat in 1940. Tray-
nor's influence was so great among judges in the United States and
abroad that his approval and citation of academic work was enough to
recommend it to other courts.17 His express adoption of either scholar's
theory might have been taken as a rejection of the other's approach.
Traynor, however, was careful to cite the work of both men, as well as
that of others, in his later opinions,' 8 and his first written acknowledg-
ment that he had placed primary reliance on Currie's work in his judi-
cial thinking19 was not published until after both scholars had died.20
A final theme in this account of Traynor's contribution to choice
of law theory lies in his membership from 1963 to 1980 on the Council
of the American Law Institute (A.L.I.).21 Under the guidance of its
Reporter, Professor Willis Reese, the A.L.I. was engaged from 1953 to
1971 in producing the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.22 This
endeavor was bitterly opposed by Ehrenzweig, who made frequent
pleas that the project be abandoned,2 3 and was scathingly criticized by
Currie.2 4 Traynor became an Adviser to the Reporter in 1966, and was
instrumental in effecting the famous compromise that infused the Re-
statement Second's "significant contacts" approach with governmental
interest analysis.2 5 Traynor, however, apparently was not persuaded
except that Ehrenzweig's is more accessible since it is in a treatise. It is to the
theoreticians in the field, to students who, like Ehrenzweig and Currie, are inter-
ested in final principles, that their differences will be important.
Id. at 238-39.
17. See, e.g., Friendly, Ablest Judge of His Generation, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1039 (1983);
Schaefer, 4 Judge's Judge, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1050 (1983).
18. Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 554,432 P.2d 727, 729, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31, 33 (1967);
Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 594-96, 360 P.2d 906, 909-10, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266, 269-70
(1961).
19. Traynor, War 4nd Peace, supra note 12, at 123.
20. Brainerd Currie died on September 7, 1965; Albert Ehrenzweig died on June 4,
1974.
21. A.L.I., 50TH ANNIVERSARY: OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL 1923-1973
at 109, 115 (1973). Traynor was elected to the A.L.I. in May 1956, and was first listed as an
elected member of the A.L.I. in A.L.I., 34TH ANNUAL MEETING: PROCEEDINGS 567 (1957),
and was listed in the 1981 Annual Report as an Emeritus Member of the Council.
22. For a brief history of this project, see Kay, Theory Into Practice, supra note 13, at
552-56.
23. E.g., Ehrenzweig, The Second Conflicts Restatement: A Last Appealfor Its With-
drawal, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1230 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Ehrenzweig, Last Appea4;
Ehrenzweig, American Conflicts Law in Its Historical Perspective: Should the Restatement Be
"Continued", 103 U. PA. L. REV. 133 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Ehrenzweig, Continueal.
24. E.g., Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson: 4 Recent Development in Conflict of
Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1242 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Currie, Comments].
25. The compromise is embodied in the addition of § 6 to the Restatement Second. See
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that the Restatement Second's method was the most promising one.
His own judgment was that governmental interest analysis, as he and
Currie had developed it in collaboration, was "the most rational ap-
proach to conflicts that we now have, and a method that may well de-
velop principles of its own that will have a long and rational life."
'2 6
Characteristically modest, however, he warned that:
A caveat precedes the synopsis. I should no more want it to be a
final view than I should want the world to come to an end. No more
can be said for it than that it proceeds from experience and reason-
ing, not dogma, and recognizes that from the Isle of Man to the Isle
of Manhattan, from the Commonwealth termed British to the un-
commonwealth termed Arabian, from Alaska to Zambia, in all as-
pects of the law from A to Z, there will be conflicts that know no
bounds.
27
This Article traces Chief Justice Traynor's significant contribution
to choice of law theory. The Article first examines the early develop-
ment of Traynor's choice of law approach, as exhibited in his first five
choice of law opinions written from 1940 through 1958. It then re-
counts Currie's announcement of his governmental interest analysis in
1958 and Justice Traynor's response in 1959. The Article next looks at
the collaboration between Traynor and Currie from 1960 through 1965
and the development of their respective approaches through Traynor's
opinions and speeches and Currie's writings. The Article then dis-
cusses Traynor's refinement of his choice of law theory during 1966-
1970 after the collaboration had ended with Currie's death. It details
the culmination of Traynor's theory after he retired from the bench,
focusing on a key lecture that spelled out his approach. Finally, the
Article evaluates Traynor's approach and concludes that it can with-
stand critical attacks and endure as an outstanding contribution to
choice of law theory.
Traynor Takes the Lead: 1940-1958
During his thirty years on the California Supreme Court, Traynor
wrote only seven opinions dealing with choice of law theory.28 Five
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971) [hereinafter cited as RESTATE-
MENT SECOND]; see also Kay, Theory Into Practice, supra note 13, at 553-55.
26. Traynor, War And Peace, supra note 12, at 127.
27. Id at 123.
28. Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551,432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); Bernkrant v.
Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961); People v. One 1953 Ford
Victoria, 48 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957); Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218
(1955); Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953); Grayhill Drilling Co. v.
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were handed down29 before Currie's first article announcing his gov-
ernmental interest approach was published in 1958.30 For seventeen
years, then, Justice Traynor struggled with the conceptual problems of
choice of law without the benefit of Currie's academic theories. That
he did struggle is evidenced both by the slow progress he made away
from the conceptual rigidity of the traditional vested-rights approach to
choice of law theory3 l in those five cases and by a statement he made in
a speech delivered on April 13, 1956, as part of the dedication ceremo-
nies of the new law school building at the University of Illinois.32
Speaking of areas in which judges sorely needed the aid of academ-
ics, Traynor highlighted conflict of laws: In certain fields, as currently
in Conflict of Laws, the wilderness grows wilder, faster than the axes
of discriminating men can keep it under control. The concepts in the
Restatement have been shattered by the devastating attacks of Cook
and Lorenzen, and the compelling logic of the proposition that in the
area between the prohibition of the due process clause and the man-
date of the full faith and credit clause, local law is supreme, has
made it necessary to search for acceptable doctrines to govern the
making of exceptions to the local law, and serve as the basis of a new
and realistic system of conflict of laws.
33
At the time he delivered this speech, Traynor had entered the "wilder-
ness" of choice of law theory on four occasions.
Superior Oil Co., 39 Cal. 2d 751,249 P.2d 21 (1952); Ohio exre Squire v. Porter, 21 Cal. 2d
45, 129 P.2d 691 (1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 757 (1943) (dissenting opinion).
Currie, in his analysis of Traynor's conflict of laws opinions, also counted among Tray-
nor's choice of law cases Intagliata v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Co., 26 Cal. 2d 365,
159 P.2d 1 (1945). See Currie, Justice Traynor, supra note 1, at 729 n.40. Since Intagliata
involved a choice between state and federal law, and mentioned conflict of laws principles
only by analogy, I do not include it in this discussion.
29. The five cases were People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 48 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480
(1957); Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d
859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953); Grayhill Drilling Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 39 Cal. 2d 751, 249 P.2d
21 (1952); Ohio ex re. Squire v. Porter, 21 Cal. 2d 45, 129 P.2d 691 (1942), cert. denied, 318
U.S. 757 (1943) (dissenting opinion).
30. Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U.
CHi. L. REV. 227 (1958) (hereinafter cited as Currie, Married Women's Contracts]. Currie
published three other conflict of laws articles in 1958: Currie, Survival ofActions: Adjudica-
tion versus Automation in the Conflict ofLaws, 10 STAN. L. REv. 205 (1958) (discussing Tray-
nor's opinion in Grant) [hereinafter cited as Currie, Surviva]; Currie, On the Displacement of
the Law of the Forum, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 964 (1958); [hereinafter cited as Currie, Displace-
ment); and Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the
Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Currie, JudicialFunction].
31. For a brief description of the traditional vested-rights approach to choice of law,
see E. SCOLas & P. HAY, supra note 15, at 13-14.
32. Dedicatory Proceedings-The New Law Building: Foreword, 1956 U. ILL. L.F., at
iii.
33. Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society, 1956 U. ILL. L.F. 230,
234 (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as Traynor, Law and Social Change].
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Porter
The first occasion was a dissenting opinion in Ohio ex rel Squire v.
Porter.3 4 Porter involved the application of a California statute of limi-
tations35 to a suit brought by the State of Ohio's Superintendent of
Banks to enforce a one hundred percent assessment against the Califor-
nia stockholders of an Ohio bank. The California statute commenced
its three-year limitations period as of the date when the liability was
created,36 while the relevant Ohio statute of limitations would not have
barred the suit until six years after the cause of action accrued.3 7 Look-
ing to Ohio law to determine when the liability had been created, the
majority decided that the triggering event was the date on which the
bank had failed to meet its obligations in the regular course of business,
rather than the date on which the Superintendent had taken possession
of the bank for the purpose of liquidation. 38 Because the former date
was more than three years from the time the suit had been filed in
California, the claim was held to be barred by the California statute of
limitations.
39
In his dissent, Justice Traynor looked beyond the words of the
California statute of limitations to its underlying purpose when enacted
in 1872: to facilitate investment in California businesses by artificially
restricting the time within which the constitutionally-imposed unlim-
ited proportional personal liability of stockholders in California corpo-
rations might be enforced.40 Since the three-year period commenced
on the date that the liability was created, irrespective of when the cause
of action accrued, the action might be barred before the right to sue
arose.4' The problem of the financial impediment to California's
growth created by unlimited liability had been solved permanently in
1930, when the state constitutional provision that had imposed it was
repealed.42 The statute of limitations, however, remained on the books
although its utility in this regard had ended. The application of the
statute to California stockholders of Ohio corporations whose liability
was limited by Ohio law to a single one hundred percent assessment in
Porter served no legislative purpose whatsoever. Traynor thus con-
34. 21 Cal. 2d 45, 129 P.2d 691 (1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 757 (1943).
35. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 359 (West 1982) (current version).
36. Porter, 21 Cal. 2d at 47, 129 P.2d at 693.
37. Id at 55, 129 P.2d at 697 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
38. Id at 47-50, 129 P.2d at 693-95.
39. Id. at 52, 129 P.2d at 695.
40. Id at 53, 129 P.2d at 696 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
41. Id at 52, 129 P.2d at 695.
42. Id at 53, 129 P.2d at 696 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
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cluded: "California has no policy necessitating the destruction of the
substantive right of the foreign bank depositor to enforce the liability
imposed upon the bank's stockholders, and no interest in riding over
such rights."
'43
Traynor neither elaborated on his use of the terms "policy" and
"interest" nor explained why he chose those terms to denote the ab-
sence of a relevant state regulatory purpose as well as the lack of any
factual basis for applying the state statute that was invoked to bar the
claim. Moreover, no authority, scholarly or precedential, was cited to
support the suggested analysis. In retrospect, however, Traynor's for-
mulation is striking in its anticipation, by sixteen years, of Currie's cho-
sen terminology. 4
GrayhiA Grant, and Emery
Ten years separated the Porter dissent from the next Traynor
choice of law opinion in Grayhill Drilling Co. v. Superior Oil Co.45
Grayhillillustrates Traynor's application of the traditional approach, as
he routinely applied the law of Oklahoma because it was the place
where the written contract and its oral modification were made and
were to be performed, as well as the place where the acts relied upon to
establish an accord and satisfaction as a defense to the oral modifica-
tion occurred.46 No claim was made that California law should be ap-
plied, or that its application would have produced a different result.
Nor did Traynor continue to develop the policy and interest analy-
sis that he had suggested in his Porter dissent in his next two choice of
law opinions, Grant v. McAultffe47 and Emery v. Emery.4 8 Both Grant
and Emery were interstate torts cases and, while Traynor's majority
opinions in both cases rejected the traditional approach in important
respects, 49 both accepted as governing law the rule adopted by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Loranger v. Nadeau50 that the law of the place
43. Id at 55, 129 P.2d at 697 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
44. The Porter dissent lay undiscovered by confficts scholars until 1961, when Currie
gave it prominence in his discussion of Traynor's contributions to choice of law. See Currie,
Justice Traynor, supra note I, at 723-3 1. See infra text accompanying notes 113-16.
45. 39 Cal. 2d 751, 249 P.2d 21 (1952).
46. Id at 754, 249 P.2d at 22.
47. 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
48. 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).
49. Neither opinion commanded the votes of the full court. Grant was a 4-3 decision,
while Emery was unanimous at 5-0 with two of the Grant dissenters, Justices Edmonds and
Schauer, not participating.
50. 215 Cal. 362, 10 P.2d 63 (1932).
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where a tort occurred created the cause of action.5' But Traynor's ad-
herence to the traditional vested-rights ideology ended at that point.
Neither in Grant nor in Emery did the California Supreme Court
reach the result preordained by the traditional view. In Grant, the Re-
statement would have dictated that the law of the place of the wrong
should decide whether the cause of action in tort survived the death of
the tortfeasor.5 2 Instead of following this dictate, Traynor recharacter-
ized the question of survival of causes of action as procedural rather
than substantive and the underlying problem as one of the administra-
tion of decedents' estates rather than of tort liability, and applied the
law of the forum where the estate was being administered.5 3 In Emery,
Traynor could have applied any of three potentially available choice of
law rules governing the capacity of family members to sue one another:
1) the place of family domicile; 2) the place of the wrong, the rule ap-
parently preferred by the Restatement54; or 3) the law of the forum, a
choice which would have been consistent with a characterization of the
capacity problem as procedural.5 5 Traynor chose the least traditional
rule: the place of family domicile.
56
Traynor's remarkable achievement in Grant and Emery was that
he produced sensible results in both cases while managing to remain at
least superficially within the framework of the rigid traditional choice
of law approach. Referring to the two cases in his University of Illinois
speech, Traynor pointedly observed: "The demolition of obsolete theo-
ries makes the judge's task harder, as he works his way out of the
wreckage; but it leaves him free to weigh competing policies without
preconceptions that purport to compel the decision, but in fact do
not."
57
The "preconceptions" so easily avoided in the confusion created
51. Id. at 366, 10 P.2d at 65. The Loranger court's holding is comparable to a later
statement in RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934) ("The law of the place of
wrong determines whether a person has sustained a legal injury.") [hereinafter cited as RE-
STATEMENT]. In neither Grant nor Emery did Traynor cite the RESTATEMENT in support of
the choice of law rule for torts adopted in Loranger.
52. RESTATEMENT, supra note 51, § 390 ("Whether a claim for damages for a tort sur-
vives the death of the tortfeasor or of the injured person is determined by the law of the
place of wrong.").
53. Grant, 41 Cal. 2d at 866-67, 264 P.2d at 949. For a discussion of characterization in
the conflict of laws, see E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 15, at 52-67.
54. RESTATEMENT, supra note 51, § 384(2) ("If no cause of action is created at the place
of wrong, no recovery in tort can be had in any other state.").
55. See supra note 53.
56. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d at 427-28, 289 P.2d at 222-23.
57. Traynor, Law and Social Change, supra note 33, at 234 (footnotes omitted).
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by the "demolition of obsolete theories" were cherished, however, by
those who prized uniformity in choice of law above flexibility. Tray-
nor's effort to point the way for others to escape the confinement of
traditional theory did not itself escape criticism. The Grant opinion, in
particular, was criticized by several law review notewriters for its
unorthodoxy,5 8 was thought to be unconstitutional by Professor Sum-
ner, 59 and was nearly overturned by legislative action.60
58. See, e.g., Note, Survival Statutes in the Conflict of Laws, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1260
(1955); Note, Conflict of Laws-Substance and Procedure-Survival Statutes-Forum Sur-
vival Statute Applies in Suit on Foreign Tort, 27 S. CAL. L. REV. 468 (1954); Note, Conflict of
Laws.- Survival ofActions is Governed by the Lex For I UCLA L. REV. 380 (1954).
59. Sumner, Choice of Law Governing Survival ofActions, 9 HASTINGS L.J. 128, 130-32
(1958) [hereinafter cited as Sumner, Choice of Law].
60. Id at 144 (reporting the narrow decision of the California Law Revision Commis-
sion not to recommend legislation specifying what law should govern survival of actions
arising elsewhere when suit is brought in California).
Criticism of Traynor's choice of law work should not have been surprising. At the time
Traynor wrote these two pathbreaking opinions in Grant and Emery, only one other state
court judge, Chief Justice Frank N. Richman of the Indiana Supreme Court, had attempted
to deal with "the unsatisfactory state of the decisions. . .[by] resort to a method used by
modern teachers of Conflict of Laws in rationalizing the results obtained by the courts in
decided cases." W.H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 585-86, 63 N.E.2d 417, 423
(1945). In Hughes, Richrman adopted a "center of gravity" approach to choice of law that he
had discovered in a law school casebook, see F. HARPER & C. TAINTOR, CASES ON CON-
FLICT OF LAWS 173-75 (1937), in order to test the validity of a contract containing a cognovit
provision. Hughes, 223 Ind. at 585-87, 63 N.E.2d at 423-24. This center of gravity approach
is decribed in Kay, Theory Into Practice, supra note 13, at 525-27. But Richmnan's Hughes
opinion posed no challenge to the traditional conflict of laws structure comparable to that
contained in Traynor's Grant opinion. Indeed, Richman cited Professors Goodrich and
Beale, stalwarts of the traditional approach, as authorities supporting his analysis, and he
used the new center of gravity approach only as an additional test of the correctness of his
conclusion that the contract was valid. Hughes, 223 Ind. at 581-87, 63 N.E.2d at 421-23.
Judge Stanley Fuld's opinion for the New York Court of Appeals in Auten v. Auten,
308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954), relied heavily on Richman's Hughes opinion for its
center of gravity terminology in upholding the validity of a matrimonial agreement, id at
160-61, 124 N.E.2d at 101-02. Auten was handed down in 1954-after Grant, but before
Emery. Fuld's more significant opinion in Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d
279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), which moved away from the contact-counting methodology of
the center of gravity approach towards an analysis of underlying state policy and interest in
an interstate guest statute case, was not published until 1963. See Cavers, Comments on
Babcock v. Jackson: A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1219,
1220-21 (1963); Currie, Comments, supra note 24, at 1233-34. Fuld's Babcock opinion cited
both Grant and Emery in support of a new approach to choice of law that "rejected the
inexorable application of the law of the place of the tort where that place has no reasonable
or relevant interest in the particular issue involved." 12 N.Y.2d at 481 & nn.10-11, 191
N.E.2d at 283 & nn.10-11,240 N.Y.S.2d at 749 & nn.10-1 I. Grantwas also cited as part of a
judicial trend towards the abandonment or modification of the traditional choice of law rule
in tort cases. Id at 478 & n.5, 191 N.E.2d at 281 & n.5, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 747 & n.5.
Other judges, such as Wisconsin Justice George R. Currie, see Haumschild v. Continen-
tal Casualty Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 134, 95 N.W.2d 814, 816 (1959) (citing Emery as the "first
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More than a year after his Emery opinion was published and
nearly six months after his University of Illinois speech was delivered,
Traynor met Currie for the first time. The occasion was another public
address by Traynor, entitled "Some Open Questions on the Work of
State Appellate Courts," 61 delivered at the University of Chicago Law
School on November 8, 1956. Traynor's description of their meeting
suggests that it led to an invitation to him to give a summer course in
conflict of laws at Chicago.62 Before accepting that invitation, how-
ever, Traynor wrote the last of his five choice of law opinions handed
down prior to the publication of Currie's first article on choice of law
theory.
Ford Victoria
People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria63 did not present a classic choice
between the competing laws of two states. Indeed, in his subsequent
analysis of Traynor's conflict of laws cases, Currie did not include the
opinion in his section on "Choice of Law." Rather, he mentioned it
briefly under the sub-heading "Criminal Matters" in his section on
"Miscellaneous Cases." 64 Traynor's later treatment of this opinion,
case to break the ice" in intrafamily torts conflicts), and Pennsylvania Justice Samuel J.
Roberts, see Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 17, 203 A.2d 796, 803 (1964) (citing
Grant as a "leading case"), followed Traynor's lead, but, as Traynor himself identified the
sequence, "[a]fter Grant v. McAuiffe, the stones began to roll." Traynor, War and Peace,
supra note 12, at 144.
Professor Harold L. Korn has provided a comprehensive re-analysis of the choice of
law opinions decided by the New York Court of Appeals, in which he asserts that "the New
York Court of Appeals enjoys the distinction of not only having been the first openly to
admit the new learning into the courts but also of having explored its ramifications more
thoroughly and wrestled with them more earnestly than any other state court." Kom, The
Choice o/Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 772, 776 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as Korn, Critique]. As I show in this Article, Kor's statement ignores Chief Justice Tray-
nor's prominent role in the development of choice of law theory, both in his opinions for the
California Supreme Court and in his articles. Despite my own criticism of that court's
choice of law opinions following Traynor's retirement in 1970, see Kay, Comparative Impair-
ment, supra note 6, I consider the California Supreme Court a better guide to the current use
of governmental interest analysis than the New York Court of Appeals ever was, except for
the brief period when Judge Keating's influence was paramount, see Kay, Theory Into Prac-
tice, supra note 13, at 536-38.
61. Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work ofAppellate Courts, 24 U. Cm. L. REV.
211 (1957).
62. Traynor, In Memoriam, supra note 14, at 12 ("In the crash of counter-questions that
followed, I declared that no judge really knew what he was judging about unless he renewed
his education regularly and that there was no better way of relearning a subject than to teach
it. Oh, just for a summer, of course, and just a fairly easy subject, like conflict-of-laws. The
twinkle of Brainerd Currie's glance should have been fair warning.").
63. 48 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957).
64. Currie, Justice Traynor, supra note 1, at 748-49.
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both in a subsequent case65 and in his articles, 66 indicates that it played
a significant role in the development of his approach to choice of law
theory-a role that Currie did not fully appreciate.
67
The case itself was relatively uncomplicated. Willie Smith bought
a car on credit from a dealer in Texas. Despite a provision in the chat-
tel mortgage that prohibited removal of the car from Texas without the
written consent of the mortgagee, Smith took the car to California and
used it there to transport marijuana.68 The Ford was seized and the
California Attorney General ified notice of his intent to forfeit the au-
tomobile pursuant to a statute permitting forfeiture of the purchaser's
interest if the automobile had been used to transport narcotics unlaw-
fully. The statute also permitted forfeiture of the mortgagee's interest
as well unless the mortgagee had made a "reasonable investigation" of
the purchaser's moral responsibility, character, and reputation.69 The
Texas mortgagee, which had made no such investigation, nevertheless
asserted the validity of its mortgage in Texas.
Traynor treated the issue as one posing a question of statutory in-
terpretation: did the "reasonable investigation" requirement apply to a
Texas mortgagee? 70 To answer this question, he first examined the un-
derlying legislative purpose. Traynor reasoned that the provision "in
effect regulates the conduct of persons financing, and thereby facilitat-
ing the sales" 7' of automobiles, while at the same time it implicitly pro-
tects public safety by requiring a character investigation "to diminish
the possibility that automobiles will be placed in the hands of persons
likely to use them to transport narcotics unlawfully. ' 72 The require-
ment, as interpreted, was a reasonable one to place on California mort-
gagees, but not on out-of-state mortgagees.73 Traynor concluded:
A person financing the sale of an automobile in Texas for use exclu-
sively in that state will look to the laws of Texas for the determina-
tion of his rights and duties. He cannot reasonably be expected to
familiarize himself with and comply in Texas with the statutes of the
48 or more jurisdictions into which the automobile could possibly be
taken without his consent and in violation of express contractual
65. Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 594-95, 360 P.2d 906, 909-10, 12 Cal. Rptr.
266, 269-70 (1961).
66. Traynor, War and Peace, supra note 12, at 132-33; Traynor, Is This Conflict Realy
Necessary?, 37 TEx. L. REV. 657, 672-73 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Traynor, NecessarA.
67. See infra notes 233-309 & accompanying text.
68. Ford Victoria, 48 Cal. 2d at 596, 311 P.2d at 482.
69. Id at 596-98, 311 P.2d at 481-82.
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prohibitions. Not only is section 11620 not made expressly applica-
ble to an innocent mortgagee financing the sale of an automobile in
another state for exclusive use there, but the statutory enumeration of
relationships between the mortgagor and the state of California in
the 1955 amendment to that section. . . plainly indicates that in re-
quiring a "reasonable investigation" to avoid forfeiture, the Legisla-
ture was preoccupied with California mortgagors and mortgagees.
74
Did Traynor apply Texas law in Ford Victoria, or did he simply
hold that the California statutory requirement of a character investiga-
tion did not apply, consequently giving effect to the California legisla-
ture's "plain . . . purpose not to forfeit the interests of innocent
mortgagees"?75 Apart from noting that the mortgage was valid in
Texas, the opinion did not discuss Texas law. But a potential conflict
between Texas and California law was asserted by the Attorney Gen-
eral's argument that the statute applied to all vehicles used to transport
narcotics unlawfully in California.76 That conflict was avoided by
Traynor's narrow reading of the statutory purpose. If the opinion had
a broader significance, it would be revealed only in future cases.
Between 1942 and 1957, Justice Traynor commenced a critical ex-
amination of the traditional mode of thinking about choice of law. The
five opinions he produced during that period did not rely on any mod-
em conflict of laws scholars for authority.77 Traynor's accomplishments
during this period were impressive. First, he had planted the seeds of a
new and positive approach to choice of law in his Porter dissent. Sec-
ond, he had turned the traditional method against its own preferred
solution to achieve a sensible result in Grant. Third, he had selected a
choice of law rule in Emery that gave primary weight to a relevant
territorial factor, family domicile, rather than to an arbitrary one, the
place of injury. Finally, he had introduced in Ford Victoria the tech-
nique of construing the interstate reach of a local statute in light of its
legislative purpose, taking into account the reasonable expectations of
74. Id. at 599, 311 P.2d at 482.
75. Id at 599, 311 P.2d at 483.
76. Id at 597, 311 P.2d at 481.
77. Traynor did mention in his University of Illinois speech the work of Walter
Wheeler Cook and Ernest G. Lorenzen. Traynor, Law and Social Change, supra note 33, at
234 (citing W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942),
and E. LORENZEN, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws (1947)). He also cited
in footnotes to the published version of that speech the work of Ehrenzweig and Chief Jus-
tice Harlan Fiske Stone's influential Yarborough dissent. Id at 234 nn.4-5 (citing
Ehrenzweig, American Conflicts Law in Its Historical Perspective-Should the Restatement Be
"Continued-4 103 U. PA. L. REV. 133 (1954), and Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202,
214 (1933) (Stone, C.J., dissenting)).
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nonresident parties. These accomplishments were Traynor's independ-
ent work.
During the summer of 1957, Traynor taught conffict of laws at the
University of Chicago Law School.78 He later described the interaction
between Currie and himself that summer:
In the learning process I came to know the magnitude of scholarship
and soul of the full-time professor of conflict-of-laws. In our fre-
quent meetings I soon learned that here was no grum groovedigger.
Here was no confirmed classifier attributing to judicial opinions a
neutralism or activism, with the notion of distinguishing them on the
basis of classificationisms that would square unto themselves all the
convolutions of a reasoning process.
One always talked law with him, and it was like advancing in
good company to new ground in mountain territory.
79
The collaboration thus began.
Currie Announces Governmental Interest Analysis-And
Traynor Responds: 1958-1959
In the fall of 1957, Brainerd Currie went to Palo Alto, California,
to take up an appointment for the academic year 1957-1958 as a Fellow
at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. Currie
later described how he had spent that year:
I regarded my troubles with conflict of laws as sufficiently important
to justify the devotion to them of this rare opportunity to spend a
year in undistracted reflection. The outcome was the series of [three]
articles. . . . [T]he earliest of the articles laid down the basic lines
of the analysis. Later articles have in the main adhered to the funda-
mentals, with some modification and elaboration.80
Thus, Currie's first three articles announcing his governmental interest
approach to choice of law, all published in 1958, were written at the
Center.81
The second of these three articles was devoted to an analysis of the
problem presented in Grant and of Justice Traynor's opinion in that
case.82 In contrast to previous commentators who had criticized the
78. UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, ANNOUNCEMENTS: THE LAW SCHOOL 13 (1957-58).
79. Traynor, In Memoriam, supra note 14, at 12-13.
80. Currie, The Verdict of Quiescent Years: Mr. Hill and the Conflict of Laws, 28 U.
CHI. L. REV. 258, 259-60 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Currie, Verdict]. For a further account
of this important period in Currie's theoretical work, see Cavers, A Correspondence With
Brainerd Currie, 1957-1958, 34 MERCER L. REv. 471 (1983).
81. B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 10, at vii.
82. Currie, Survival, supra note 30.
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court for its unorthodoxy in Grant,83 Currie had praise for its innova-
tions and sympathy for its plight. He stated:
The California Supreme Court is one of several courts in this country
which are making serious efforts to break away from sterile formal-
ism and to develop a rational approach to conflict-of-laws problems
I believe not only that the actual result in the Grant case was
"justifiable" on the facts, but also that the approach to conflict-of-
laws problems which the California Supreme Court adopted in that
case is sound, constructive, and likely to prove fruitful in the search
for more intelligent ways of handling such problems.
84
But Currie's praise was not without reservation. He "conceded that the
opinion in the Grant case is not one which gives clear guidance as to the
future course of development of conffict of laws in California concern-
ing survival of actions. '8 5 Currie recognized that the Grant court's use
of "the traditional escape device of novel characterization"8 6 had
aroused criticism. Instead of chastising the Grant court, however, Cur-
rie laid at least partial blame at the feet of legal scholars, who he felt
had "not provided the courts with a systematic method of analysis
whereby the sound instincts employed by a sensitive court in the adju-
dication of conflict-of-laws cases can be fitted into the conventions and
the terminology of the legal order."87 Currie concluded that the schol-
ars had not "suggested any method whereby the courts could select the
appropriate law objectively, ' 8  and he was determined to try his hand
at proposing such a method. The result was governmental interest
analysis.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
84. Currie, Survival, supra note 30, at 208.
85. Id at 208-09. Currie continued:
The reason for that is understandable. Confronted with a situation in which the
result dictated by the orthodox system of conflict of laws was manifestly absurd,
and in which the just and rational result was clear, the court availed itself of one of
the several escape devices which are built into the system itself. It characterized
the problem differently, and the different characterization produced the result
which had previously been recognized as the sound one. This is a device which has
long been used by the courts. It is far from an ideal way of dealing with such
situations. Certainly it would be better if the courts could state explicitly the con-
siderations which led them in the first place to determine what the result should be,
and indicate clearly how those considerations will be appraised in other cases.
Id at 209.
86. Id. at 209.
87. Id at 209-10.
88. Id. at 210.
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Currie's Methodology
The three articles Currie produced at the Center, including the
Grant article, set forth the basic core of his governmental interest analy-
sis. While a comprehensive statement of Currie's theory is unnecessary
in an article devoted to a study of Traynor's contributions to choice of
law, it is necessary to give enough information to permit the reader to
compare and contrast the ideas of the two men. Perhaps because inter-
est analysis abandoned so much of traditional thinking about choice of
law that he felt a simplified methodological statement would make the
analysis easier to use, or perhaps merely because his mind had an or-
derly turn, Currie set out his theory in a series of steps that could be
followed by a court desirous of adopting the approach. Currie pro-
duced three of these methodological statements, the first two of which it
is appropriate to review briefly 89 at this point.90
These first two statements of the methodology of governmental in-
terest analysis were virtually identical. The first, published in 1959, ap-
peared in a short paper devoted to choice of law methods91 and is the
one most commonly cited as setting out Currie's approach. It reads as
follows:
1. Normally, even in cases involving foreign elements, the court
should be expected, as a matter of course, to apply the rule of deci-
sion found in the law of the forum.
2. When it is suggested that the law of a foreign state should furnish
the rule of decision, the court should, first of all, determine the gov-
ernmental policy expressed in the law of the forum. It should then
inquire whether the relation of the forum to the case is such as to
provide a legitimate basis for the assertion of an interest in the appli-
cation of that policy. This process is essentially the familiar one of
construction or interpretation. Just as we determine by that process
how a statute applies in time, and how it applies to marginal domes-
tic situations, so we may determine how it should be applied to cases
involving foreign elements in order to effectuate the legislative
purpose.
3. If necessary, the court should similarly determine the policy ex-
89. Because this article focuses on Justice Traynor's contributions to choice of law,
Justice Currie's theory is presented in sufficient detail only to allow a comparison between
the ideas of the two men. For a more comprehensive discussion of Justice Currie's theory,
see E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supranote 15, at 16-20; Sedler, The GovernmentalInterest Approach
to Choice of Law: An Analysis anda Reformulation, 25 UCLA L. REv. 181, 183-90 (1977). A
more critical summary appears in Kom, Critique, supra note 60, at 811-16.
90. Currie's third methodological statement, and Traynor's response to it, are discussed
infra notes 162-91 & accompanying text.
91. Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J.
171 [hereinafter cited as Currie, Notes].
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pressed by the foreign law, and whether the foreign state has an in-
terest in the application of its policy.
4. If the court finds that the forum state has no interest in the appli-
cation of its policy, but that the foreign state has, it should apply the
foreign law.
5. If the court finds that the forum state has an interest in the appli-
cation of its policy, it should apply the law of the forum, even though
the foreign state also has an interest in the application of its contrary
policy, and, afortiori, it should apply the law of the forum if the
foreign state has no such interest.92
The second statement,93 which bears a 1958 publication date but actu-
ally was written after the version published in 1959, 94 contains a more
detailed description of the terms "policy" and "interest," which were
not defined in the first statement. It also omits the reference to statu-
tory construction contained in step two of the earlier statement.95
These two statements represent Currie's original view of what a court
should do when confronted with a choice of law case.
Currie's initial statement drew criticism from academics, 96 much
92. Id. at 178.
93. Currie, Judicial Function, supra note 30, at 9-10.
94. B. CURRIE, SELECTED EssAys, supra note 10, at vii, ix.
95. The second methodological statement reads as follows:
1. Normally, even in cases involving foreign factors, a court should as a matter of
course look to the law of the forum as the source of the rule of decision.
2. When it is suggested that the law of a foreign state, rather than the law of the
forum, should furnish the rule of decision, the court should first of all determine
the governmental policy-perhaps it is helpful to say the social, economic, or ad-
ministrative policy-which is expressed by the law of the forum. The court should
then inquire whether the relationship of the forum state to the case at bar-that is,
to the parties, to the transaction, to the subject matter, to the litigation-is such as
to bring the case within the scope of the state's governmental concern, and to pro-
vide a legitimate basis for the assertion that the state has an interest in the applica-
tion of its policy in this instance.
3. If necessary, the court should similarly determine the policy expressed in the
proffered foreign law, and whether the foreign state has a legitimate interest in the
application of that policy to the case at bar.
4. If the court finds that the forum state has no interest in the application of its
law and policy, but that the foreign state has such an interest, it should apply the
foreign law.
5. If the court finds that the forum state has an interest in the application of its
law and policy, it should apply the law of the forum even though the foreign state
also has such an interest, and, afortiori, it should apply the law of the forum if the
foreign state has no such interest.
Currie, Judicial Function, supra note 30, at 9-10 (footnotes omitted).
96. See, e.g., Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor
Currie, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 463, 479-81 (1960). Professor von Mehren characterized Currie's
theory as "a point of view that is in its way as narrow and as dogmatic as the approach of
the original Restatement which Currie so effectively attacks." Von Mehren, Book Review,
17 J. LEGAL EDUC. 91, 96-97 (1964). This criticism was rejected by Traynor in his review of
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of it directed at his failure to seek interstate solutions, which may differ
from domestic outcomes, to the interstate problems presented in choice
of law cases. His ultimate response to these latter objections was re-
flected in his third methodological statement,97 which was made in
1964 and drew heavily upon Traynor's 1961 opinion in Bernkrant v.
Fowler.98
Traynor's Response
Currie did not claim that Traynor had used his proposed method
of analysis in Grant, but he did suggest that the result in that case could
be restated in terms of governmental interest analysis:
The decision in the Grant case is consistent with a method of analysis
which I think holds promise of considerable utility in the intelligent
and objective adjudication of conffict-of-laws cases. I do not suggest
that the California court consciously employed any such analysis. I
suggest that the result which that court recognized on common-sense
grounds as the sound one, and then justified by a traditionally au-
thorized manipulation of the concepts of the system, can be ex-
plained and justified by objective analysis.99
Thus Currie, in his second major article setting out his theory of choice
of law, identified Traynor as the judge whose work was consistent with
that theory.
Because no choice of law cases came before the California
Supreme Court between 1958 and 1961, Justice Traynor did not imme-
diately embrace Currie's theory and methodology from the bench, but
he warmly applauded Currie's theory from the podium. Delivering the
Law Day Address at the University of Texas School of Law on April
24, 1959, Justice Traynor chose to focus his remarks on conflict of
laws °° and to highlight the announcement of Currie's governmental
interest analysis. 01 Moreover, Justice Traynor went further: he refor-
mulated the holdings of Grant, Emery, and Ford Victoria in interest
analysis terms. Grant, he said, had posed "no real conflict of laws."
102
Justice Traynor thus classified the case, as Currie had done in his sec-
Currie's Selected Essay.: "On the contrary, Currie's brilliant essays have led us away from
the narrow and dogmatic. They should do much to encourage consideration by the forum
court of all relevant factors as it delineates the reach of local policy in conflicts cases." Tray-
nor, Book Review, 1965 DUKE L.J. 426, 434 [hereinafter cited as Traynor, Review].
97. See infra text accompanying notes 165-66.
98. 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961).
99. Currie, Survival supra note 30, at 210.
100. Traynor, Necessary, supra note 66.
101. Id. at 667-68.
102. Id at 670.
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ond article, 0 3 as a "false conflict."' 4 In a footnote, Traynor acknowl-
edged that the opinion had not been "ideally articulated" 105-a
graceful bow to Currie's gentle criticism of the Grant reasoning. 
1 06
Traynor restated the Emery holding in terms of policy and interest:
"because of its substantial contacts with the case, the state had enough
interest in the application of its policy to invoke local law as the appro-
priate law."10 7 Traynor, however, did not repudiate his acceptance of a
choice of law rule based on family domicile.108 Ford Victoria now ap-
peared to Traynor to have been a false conflict case. Once the Califor-
nia policy had been appropriately limited, "[tihere was thus no conflict
between the restricted local policy and the Texas policy of protecting a
mortgagee's contractual rights. The parallel lines never met."' 0 9 In
this speech, Traynor did not mention his dissent in Porter.
Thus, in the year following Currie's announcement of governmen-
tal interest analysis, Traynor took the opportunity presented by a pub-
lic lecture to hail the new method and to reconceptualize three of his
own choice of law opinions in light of that theory. The stage was set
for further collaboration.
The Collaboration at Work: 1960-1965
Currie Evaluates Traynor's Work
In his 1959 University of Texas speech, Traynor had referred to
five of Currie's articles on choice of law theory." 10 During 1960, Currie
published four more."' In 1961, as part of a symposium in the Stan-
103. Currie, Survival, supra note 30, at 227-28.
104. A "false conffict" case is one in which only one state has a legitimate interest in
having its policy applied in the case. See Kay, Comparative Impairment, supra note 6, at 578
& n.10.
105. Traynor, Necessary, supra note 66, at 670 n.35.
106. Currie, Survival, supra note 30, at 209-10. See supra notes 84-88 & accompanying
text.
107. Traynor, Necessary, supra note 66, at 669.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 673.
110. Traynor, Necessary, supra note 66, at 667 n.28. The articles mentioned were Currie,
Married Women's Contracts, supra note 30; Currie, Survival, supra note 30; Currie, Displace-
ment, supra note 30; Currie, Judicial Function, supra note 30; and Currie, Notes, supra note
91.
111. Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws: A Retraction, 27 U. CHI. L. REv.
341 (1960); Currie & Lieberman, Purchase-Money Mortgages and State Lines: A Study in
Conflict-of-Laws Method, 1960 DUKE L.J. 1; Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimina-
tion in the Conflict ofLaws: EqualProtection, 28 U. Cm. L. REV. 1 (1960); Currie & Schreter,
Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Privileges and Immunities, 69 YALE
L.J. 1323 (1960).
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ford Law Review honoring Traynor, Currie contributed an article ana-
lyzing all of Traynor's published opinions in the field of conflict of
laws. 12 While working on this article, Currie "discovered" Traynor's
dissent in Porter and immediately recognized the similarity between
Traynor's analysis and his own theory." 3 Quoting the passage cited
above,"14 Currie excoriated legal scholars-himself presumably in-
cluded" 15-for failing to recognize the significance of Traynor's words
at the time they were written:
He did not develop this theme at length; after all, he had forty-two
other opinions to write in 1942. But what are law reviews for? Here
was a quite indefensible decision, purportedly dictated by conffict-of-
laws principles; here also, in the dissent, were common sense, insight,
and guidance as to how a rational method of analyzing conflict-of-
laws problems might be developed. If legal scholars had been on the
alert, might they not have been inspired by this dissent to turn away
'from the banalities and the logic chopping of the conventional sys-
tem, and to develop a method of analysis in terms of the policies and
interests of the states involved?
116
Revisiting Traynor's opinion in Grant, Currie once again defended
Traynor's alternative characterization of the problem in that case-as
one involving decedents' estates rather than torts, or as one relating to
procedure rather than substance-as being "sound."" 7 At the same
time, Currie permitted himself the indulgence of wishing for something
better:
Still, one regrets that he chose this technique instead of spelling out
the considerations of policy and interest involved, as he had done in
the Porter case. But more than a decade had elapsed since that case
was decided, and the legal scholars who might have developed his
approach into a substitute for the capricious traditional system had
done little or nothing in that direction. To win acceptance, the opin-
ion had to wear traditional dress." 8
Currie took comfort in the fact that Traynor, in his University of Texas
speech, had "stated [Grant's] rationale explicitly in terms of govern-
112. Currie, Justice Traynor, supra note 1.
113. Id. at 723-29.
114. Id at 727. See supra text accompanying note 43.
115. In an earlier description of his research into the historical origins and modem
rediscovery of an analysis based on state policy and interests, Currie did not cite the Porter
dissent, nor did he mention Justice Traynor. Instead, he credited United States Supreme
Court Justice Harlan Fiske Stone with the "modem rediscovery of the importance of gov-
ernmental interests" in choice of law. See Currie, Verdict, supra note 80, at 282-84.
116. Currie, Justice Traynor, supra note I, at 727-28.
117. Id at 730. Currie did find it "regrettable," however, that Traynor chose to utilize
the technique of alternative characterization in rationalizing his result. Id
118. Id.
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mental policies and interests," '" 9 and noted with delight Traynor's wry
observation that the opinion might have been more "deft."'
20
Turning to Traynor's Emery opinion, Currie emphasized the "con-
sequences of the classification" of the problem as one of capacity to
sue, 21 rather than the fact that the opinion had adopted a choice of law
rule. Drawing on Porter, which had not been cited in Emery, and
Grant, which had been, 22 Currie concluded, "[t]hus the opinion em-
ploys a combination of the techniques used in Porter and Grant v. Mc-
AulZfe. alternative characterization, supported by pragmatic inquiry
into the respective interests of the states."'
23
In the "choice of law" section of his article, Currie discussed only
Traynor's Porter, Grant,124 and Emery opinions. 25 Traynor's opinion
in Ford Victoria was given one paragraph in a later subsection entitled
"Criminal Matters."'' 26 Currie's evaluation of Ford Victoria was that
"[t]he case is a fine illustration of how a court may, by defining local
interests with moderation and restraint, avoid conflict with the interests
of another state."' 27 This point, although mentioned only briefly, is
significant. It suggests that Ford Victoria was not a false conflict case,
like Grant or Emery. Rather, Currie saw Ford Victoria as a case in
which a potential conflict had existed, but had been avoided by Tray-
nor through moderation and restraint in the definition of local interests.
By noting that Traynor had restated the rationale of the case in terms
of governmental policy and interest in his University of Texas
speech,128 Currie tacitly acknowledged that Traynor did in fact view
the case as one involving choice of law theory. But Currie did not pro-
ceed further to reflect on the implications that such a view of the case
might hold for his own methodology. The insight produced by such
reflection would await Currie's analysis of Traynor's subsequent opin-
119. Id. at 730. See Traynor, Necessary, supra note 66, at 670.
120. Currie, Justice Traynor, supra note 1, at 730 (quoting Traynor, Necessary, supra
note 66, at 670 n.35).
121. Id at 732.
122. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d at 425, 289 P.2d at 221.
123. Currie, Justice Traynor, supra note 1, at 732.
124. Currie discussed Grant only briefly, referring to his earlier article for a full analysis.
See id. at 729 & n.43 (citing Currie, Survival, supra note 30).
125. Id. at 723-33. Currie cited two additional California cases: Grayhill Drilling Co. v.
Superior Oil Co., 39 Cal. 2d 751, 249 P.2d 21 (1952), and Intagliata v. Shipowners &
Merchants Towboat Co., 26 Cal. 2d 365, 159 P.2d 1 (1945). Grayhill is discussed supra text
accompanying notes 45-46; Intagliata is not discussed here because it did not involve choice
of law theory. See supra note 28.
126. Currie, Justice Traynor, supra note 1, at 748-49.
127. Id. at 749.
128. Id. at 749 n.119 (citing Traynor, Necessary, supra note 66, at 672-73).
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ion in Bernkrant v. Fowler.
129
Thus, in his analysis of Traynor's conflict of laws cases, Currie
gave prominence to those concerned with choice of law, noting that
"some of Justice Traynor's boldest and most controversial opinions
have dealt with this problem." 130 Currie emphasized Traynor's use of
the concepts of policy and interest in his Porter dissent, and he noted
Traynor's reconceptualization of Grant, Emery, and Ford Victoria in
terms consistent with his own theory. He hailed Traynor as one who
had "earned a place of distinction in [the] select group"'131 of "modern
American judges whose work has contributed to enlightenment and to
the cause of justice and reason in the conflict of laws."132 Finally, as he
had done in his earlier article on Grant,133 Currie acknowledged the
constraints that prevented judges from building systematic conflict of
laws theories, 134 and placed the blame squarely on academics for fail-
ing to give judges like Traynor the help they sought.135 Given the pub-
lic statements of mutual esteem expressed by Currie, in his Stanford
Law Review article, and by Traynor, in his University of Texas speech,
it may not be amiss to surmise that Currie hoped--"expected" may be
too strong-that Traynor would adopt his approach to choice of law
when the next opportunity arose. That opportunity presented itself in
Bernkrant.
Bernkrant
Bernkrant v. Fowler,136 Traynor's first choice of law opinion to be
129. 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961). See infra notes 136-54 &
accompanying text.
130. Currie, Justice Traynor, supra note I, at 723.
131. Id at 721.
132. Id. at 720-21.
133. Currie, Survival, supra note 30, at 208-10.
134. Currie, Justice Traynor, supra note I, at 721 ("Like other judges, he lacks leisure to
develop a comprehensive philosophy of conflict of laws while scores of cases of all kinds
press for his attention.").
135. Currie wrote:
If, therefore, we of the cloistered precincts have fault to find with Traynor's opin-
ions in conflict-of- laws cases-if we sometimes think his methods disingenuous, if
he is suspected of indulging a predilection because there is no articulated general
principle on which he can rely-the fault is our own. We have failed to do the part
of the job that judges cannot be expected to do. While it is true that a great judge's
flashes of intuition can accomplish more than could a brace of pedants in a decade,
it is only those who have both professional competence and time for research and
reflection who can be charged with responsibility for systematic improvement of
the law.
Id. at 723.
136. 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961).
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published after Currie's announcement of his governmental interest
analysis, was handed down on April 13, 1961. The California Supreme
Court declined to apply the California statute of frauds to protect the
estate of a California decedent against an oral contract to forgive in-
debtedness by will entered into in Nevada, where the oral contract
would have been valid.'
37
There was little in the Bernkrant opinion itself to discourage the
hopes of Currie or any of the other modem choice of law theorists for
Traynor's ultimate endorsement of their proposals. Departing from his
previous practice of not citing conflicts writers in his opinions, Traynor
mentioned works by Professors Currie,138 Ehrenzweig,1
39 Lorenzen,140
and Cheatham and Reese.14' Traynor placed greatest reliance in his
structuring of the opinion, however, on his own previous reasoning in
Ford Victoria.'42
Just as the California legislature had failed to specify the interstate
reach of the forfeiture statute at issue in Ford Victoria, it also had not
"spelled out the extent to which the statute of frauds is to apply" in
conflicts cases such as Bernkrant. 143 Therefore, in Bernkrant, as in Ford
Victoria, the court's task was to "determine its scope in the light of
applicable principles of the law of conflict of laws." '44 The principles
of construction adopted in Ford Victoria meant that if all parties to the
contract were Nevada residents, as they had been when the original
contract of sale had been made, the California statute of frauds should
137. Id at 594-96, 360 P.2d at 908-10, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 269-70.
138. Id at 594-96, 360 P.2d at 909-10, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 269-70 (citing B. CURRIE, SE-
LECTED ESSAYS, supra note 10; Currie, Married Women's Contracts, supra note 30).
139. Id. at 596, 360 P.2d at 910, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 270 (citing Ehrenzweig, The Statute of
Frauds in the Conflict of Laws, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 874 (1959)).
Currie had not been alone in hoping for Traynor's endorsement of his theory. In April
1962 Ehrenzweig published his Treatise on Conflict of Laws. After much indecision, he had
decided not to dedicate the volume to Traynor. But the preface prominently cited Traynor's
work, see A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS at vii (1962) [hereinaf-
ter cited as A. EHRENZWEIG, TREATISE], and Ehrenzweig provided his own analysis of Tray-
nor's choice of law decisions, see id at 313 (Grant), 581 (Emery), particularly Bernkrant,
which he claimed in support of his proposed "Rule of Validation" for contracts conflicts
cases, see id at 475. A court following the "Rule of Validation" in contracts conflicts cases,
if faced with a reasonable choice between conflicting laws, should choose the law that vali-
dates the contract.
140. Bernkrant, 55 Cal. 2d at 596, 360 P.2d at 910, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 270 (citing Lorenzen,
The Statute of Frauds and the Conflicts of Laws, 32 YALE L.J. 311, 328 (1923)).
141. Id (citing Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REV.
959, 979-80 (1952)).
142. See id. at 594-95, 360 P.2d at 909, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 269.
143. Id at 594, 360 P.2d at 909, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 269.
144. Id
[Vol. 35
not be interpreted to upset their normal expectation that Nevada law
governed their agreement. 145 Even if the decedent had become a Cali-
fornia resident by the time the oral contract was made, the result
should not be different. Like the Texas mortgagee in Ford Victoria, the
Nevada purchasers should not be required to anticipate the laws of all
the possible places their vendor might choose to settle before his will
became effective. Considering "both the policy to protect the reason-
able expectations of the parties and the policy of the statute of
frauds,"' 46 Traynor concluded that California "would have no interest
in applying its own statute of frauds unless [the vendor] remained here
until his death."' 47
Even though the vendor in Bernkrant did die in California, Tray-
nor's analysis of California policy was confined to the circumstances as
they existed at the time the oral agreement had been made, not at the
time of the vendor's subsequent death. At the time the oral contract
had been made, he concluded, the "plaintiffs were not bound to know
that California's statute might ultimately be invoked against them." "ns
Instead, they were entitled to rely on the application of their own law.
Accordingly, the California statute did not apply. Unlike the opinion
in Ford Victoria, however, the Bernkrant opinion made clear which law
was being applied:
Since there is thus no conflict between the law of California and the
law of Nevada, we can give effect to the common policy of both
states to enforce lawful contracts and sustain Nevada's interest in
protecting its residents and their reasonable expectations growing out
of a transaction substantially related to that state without subordinat-
ing any legitimate interest of this state.' 49
This language suggests that Traynor may have viewed Bernkrant, like
Grant and Emery, as a false conflict case. Currie's response to this im-
plicit suggestion formed a major part of his reaction to Bernkrant, and
produced a significant change in his choice of law methodology.
Currie's Response to Bernkrant
Currie's initial brief response to Traynor's Bernkrant opinion ap-
peared in his 1961 Stanford Law Review article analyzing Traynor's
conflict of laws opinions. 50 Because Bernkrant was decided while Cur-
145. Id.




150. Currie, Justice Traynor, supra note 1. See supra notes 110-35 & accompanying text.
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tie's article was in the process of publication, Currie was unable to do
more than mention the new opinion in his final footnote. His praise
was unrestrained:
[S]o revolutionary an opinion cannot go unremarked. It is probably
the only judicial opinion concerning the Statute of Frauds in the con-
flict of laws that does not so much as mention the substance-proce-
dure dichotomy. The analysis is explicitly in terms of governmental
policies and interests. The problem is approached as one of statutory
construction. The restraint and moderation with which domestic in-
terests are defined raise a standard to which the wise and honest can
repair, and should be a reproach to those who feel that the method of
governmental-interest analysis must necessarily produce egocentric
or provincial results. 151
This appraisal suggests that Currie believed that Traynor had adopted
his governmental interest analysis approach to choice of law. But Cur-
rie's subsequent study of the opinion seems to have changed his mind.
Currie's more considered appraisal of Traynor's Bernkrant opin-
ion appeared in 1963 when he observed, in response to Traynor's ap-
parent view of Bernkrant as a false conflict case, that it was not helpful
to speak of cases like Bernkrant as "false problem" cases.152 Instead,
analysis showed that Bernkrant "was a case in which the forum state
could reasonably assert an interest in the application of its law and
policy; it was only after painstaking analysis that the court could say,
because of its delimitation of local interests," that no conflict existed
between the law of California and the law of Nevada.1
53
If Bernkrant did not fit neatly into Currie's announced interest
analysis method for deciding choice of law cases, then he was not loath
to change his methodology to accommodate Traynor's analysis. Currie
reformulated his prior division of choice of law cases into false
problems and true conflicts cases to include three categories:
(1) Those in which analysis indicates that only one state has an inter-
est in the application of its policy; (2) those in which it appears that
each state would be constitutionally justified in asserting an interest,
but on reflection conflict is avoided by a moderate definition of the
policy or interest of one state or the other; (3) those in which a con-
flict of interests persists despite efforts to avoid it by moderate defini-
tion of policies and interests. 15
4
151. Currie, Justice Traynor, supra note 1, at 778 n.236.
152. Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 754, 763 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Currie, Disinteresteal.
153. Id.
154. Id. (citing B. CURRIE, SELECTED EssAys, supra note 10, at 616). Currie explained
that "[t]here is, unfortunately, such a thing as limited insight. In my earlier writings I con-
centrated the analysis on a hypothetical state that could be counted on to assert its interests
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Currie identified Bernkrant as an illustration of the newly-created sec-
ond class of cases.
55
Currie refrained from claiming that Traynor had adopted govern-
mental interest analysis in Bernkrant, noting that "[i]n the reasons for
the result there is something to comfort each of the contending camps
but triumphant satisfaction for none." 156 He added: "I find the opinion
congenial because it speaks in terms of governmental interests and be-
cause the method is explicitly that of statutory construction."' 57
Ehrenzweig, for his part, had previously rejected any such claim with
the fiat assertion that "Justice Traynor's use of these terms [Le., govern-
mental policies and interests] is his own rather than Currie's."' 5 8 But
Traynor himself never used any of the potentially available labels' 59 in
his subsequent discussion of his Bernkrant opinion.160 He continued to
refer to Bernkrant and Ford Victoria as paired examples of judicial in-
terpretation of local statutes to determine their application to interstate
circumstances.' 6'
to the constitutional limit.... In consequence, the 'restrained and enlightened forum' was
relatively neglected." Id. at 763 n.34.
155. In other cases analysis may at first indicate an apparent conflict of interests;
specifically, it may be clear that !the forum were to assert an interest in the appli-
cation of its policy, it would be constitutionally justified in doing so. But no princi-
ple dictates that a state exploit every possible conflict, or exert to the outermost
limits its constitutional power. On the contrary, to assert a conflict between the
interests of the forum and the foreign state is a serious matter; the mere fact that a
suggested broad conception of a local interest will create conflict with that of a
foreign state is a sound reason why the conception should be re-examined, with a
view to a more moderate and restrained interpretation both of the policy and of the
circumstances in which it must be applied to effectuate the forum's legitimate pur-
pose. An analysis of this kind (according to my thinking, which again is perhaps
wishful) was brilliantly performed by Justice Traynor in Bernkrant v. Fowler. The
policy of the California statute, of which there was no counterpart in Nevada, was
to protect decedents' estates from false claims based on alleged oral contracts to
make wills. That policy might reasonably be said to extend to all estates being
administered in California, especially those of local domiciliaries. No constitu-
tional principle would be offended by such an application. But Justice Traynor,
considering all the circumstances, concluded that no such broad application was
necessary to effectuate the legislative policy. He therefore declined to apply the
California statute, thus avoiding conflict with Nevada law and policy.
Id. at 757-58. See also Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 DUKE L.J. 1,
30.
156. Currie, Disinterested, supra note 152, at 758.
157. Id
158. A. EHRENZWEIG, TREATISE, supra note 139, at 475 n.37.
159. See also Horowitz, Restatement, supra note 2, at 743-44 (characterizing Bernkrant as
a "false false-conflict").
160. See infra notes 274-88 & accompanying text.
161. Traynor, War andPeace, supra note 12, at 132-34.
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In 1964 Currie prepared a revised statement, his third such state-
ment,162 of his choice of law methodology for inclusion in a law school
casebook. 63 This statement featured a new step three based on his
1963 article analyzing Traynor's opinion in Bernkrant.164 It also con-
solidated the first three steps of the previous statements into one initial
step and added step five, giving directions for the forum that found
itself to be disinterested, but unable to avoid decision of the case. 65
The statement concluded with a final observation on the implications
of the method. Currie's 1964 statement, as quoted in the present edi-
tion of the Reese and Rosenberg casebook, reads as follows:
1. When a court is asked to apply the law of a foreign state different
from the law of the forum, it should inquire into the policies ex-
pressed in the respective laws, and into the circumstances in which it
is reasonable for the respective states to assert an interest in the ap-
plication of those policies. In making these determinations the court
should employ the ordinary processes of construction and
interpretation.
2. If the court finds that one state has an interest in the application
of its policy in the circumstances of the case and the other has none,
it should apply the law of the only interested state.
3. If the court finds an apparent conflict between the interests of the
two states, it should reconsider. A more moderate and restrained in-
terpretation of the policy or interest of one state or the other may
avoid conflict.
4. If, upon reconsideration, the court finds that a conflict between
the legitimate interests of the two states is unavoidable, it should ap-
ply the law of the forum.
5. If the forum is disinterested, but an unavoidable conflict exists
between the interests of two other states, and the court cannot with
justice decline to adjudicate the case, it should apply the law of the
forum, at least if that law corresponds with the law of one of the
other states. Alternatively, the court might decide the case by a can-
did exercise of legislative discretion, resolving the conflict as it be-
lieves it would be resolved by a supreme legislative body having
power to determine which interest should be required to yield.
6. The conflict of interest between states will result in different dis-
positions of the same problem, depending on where the action is
brought. If with respect to a particular problem this appears seri-
ously to infringe a strong national interest in uniformity of decision,
the court should not attempt to improvise a solution sacrificing the
legitimate interest of its own state, but should leave to Congress, ex-
ercising its powers under the full faith and credit clause, the determi-
162. See supra notes 91-98 & accompanying text.
163. See W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS
469 (7th ed. 1977).
164. Id. at 470 (relying on Currie, Disinterested, supra note 152, at 757-64)).
165. Id. (relying on Currie, Disinterested, supra note 152, at 764-85) (discussing the prob-
lem of the disinterested third state).
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nation of which interest shall be required to yield. 166
Thus, Currie acknowledged Traynor's influence upon his thinking by
altering his methodology to incorporate a new concept-that of an ap-
parent conflict which might be avoided by Traynor's moderate and re-
strained interpretation.
The Academic Debate
The December 1964 Conflict of Laws Round Table at the meeting
of the Association of American Law Schools focused on Ehrenzweig's
Treatise.167 The published proceedings 168 include a blistering attack by
Currie 169 on Ehrenzweig's proposed Rule of Validation in statute of
frauds cases.170 In his concluding remarks, Currie specifically rejected
the claim that Traynor's Bernkrant opinion supported Ehrenzweig's
thesis. Currie's rejection was made despite his earlier concession that
Ehrenzweig "may well applaud" the reasoning in Bernkrant, "[s]ince
the law applied was that which gave validity to the contract, to the
accompaniment of references to the expectations of the parties," 71 and
despite Traynor's citation of Ehrenzweig's article on the statute of
frauds and conflict of laws in the Bernkrant opinion. 172 At the Round
Table, Currie pointedly observed:
Almost every conflict-of-laws pundit can claim some support from
this catholic opinion; I have staked my own claim. Whether I have a
better claim than anyone else is of course open to question; I insist,
however, on one point: to cite this sophisticated opinion as one sup-
porting a "rule of validation" regardless of the governmental inter-
ests involved is not a high compliment to its distinguished author.
173
In an accompanying footnote, Currie predicted that "[s]ome light on
the question may be shed by Chief Justice Traynor's review of my Se-
lected Essays, to appear in a forthcoming issue of the Duke Law
Journal."174
The reception accorded Currie's Selected Essays75 signalled his
growing influence on American choice of law theory. This influence
166. Id at 470.
167. A. EHRENZWEIG, TREATISE, supra note 139.
168. Ehrenzweig's Proper Law and Proper Forum: A Symposium on Conflict of Laws, 18
OKLA. L. REV. 233 (1965).
169. Currie, Ehrenzweig and the Statute of Frauds: An Inquiry Into the 'Rule of Valida-
tion' 18 OKLA. L. REV. 243 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Currie, InquirA.
170. A. EHRENZWEIG, TREATISE, supra note 139, at 470-75.
171. Currie, Disinterested, supra note 152, at 758.
172. See supra note 139.
173. Currie, Inquiry, supra note 169, at 338-39.
174. Id at 339 n.316.
175. B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 10.
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was recognized in December 1964 when he became the first recipient of
The Order of the Coifs Triennial Book Award for his Selected Es-
say.s 1.76 Traynor was one of two judges who served on the selection
panel for the award, along with three academics and a practitioner. 177
Traynor's subsequent review of the work,178 alluded to by Currie in his
footnote, was indeed laudatory. It did not indicate, however, in specific
terms that Traynor had accepted Currie's theory as the basis for his
own work. Indeed, he mentioned Ehrenzweig as one of the scholars
who was then working on the task of redeveloping conflicts theory after
the demise of the traditional approach. 79 Still, Traynor's praise for
Currie's book was lavish. Such statements as "[o]ne is moved to won-
der where we would now be drifting in conflicts were it not for Brai-
nerd Currie"180 and "[elvery court in the land is in his debt"' 8 ' indicate
Traynor's high regard for Currie's efforts. As he had done in his Uni-
versity of Texas speech, Traynor applied Currie's concepts to describe
his own opinions. He cited Grant and Emery as examples of "false con-
flicts cases, the cases in which it becomes apparent that only one state
has an interest in applying its rule."' 82 But he cited no California cases
to illustrate the category of "real conflicts," cases in which "[a]nalysis
of the laws of the respective states may demonstrate that each has an
applicable policy and a reasonable interest in having it applied."'
8 3
In concluding his review, Traynor commented on how courts
should approach choice of law cases:
Obviously conflict of laws is in transition. It is still too soon to deter-
mine whether any rational system of rules to govern choice-of-law
problems can ever be articulated. Courts must nevertheless continue
to assess the scope of their local policies in conflicts contexts; they
have a responsibility to inform themselves not only of past prece-
dents but also of the policy reasons advanced by the advocates of the
new rules or postulates. Though no rules, short of constitutional
command, compel the forum to restrict the scope of its own policy
when it has an interest in applying it, the reasons advanced in sup-
176. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, 1964 PROCEEDINGS PART Two: AN-
NUAL MEETING 76-81 (1964).
177. Id. at 78-79. The other members of the Selection Panel were Justice Walter Schae-
fer of the Illinois Supreme Court, Mr. Whitney North Seymour, past President of the Ameri-
can Bar Association, Provost Edward H. Levi of the University of Chicago, and Professors
Leo Levin and John Dawson, Chair.
178. Traynor, Review, supra note 96.
179. Id. at 426.
180. Id at 427.
181. Id at 436.
182. Id. at 431.
183. Id. Traynor used Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526,
211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961), as an example.
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port of such rules may be relevant in determining the scope of local
policy. At the same time the growing realization that there are no
final answers to conflicts questions may cause us to take a fresh view
of old precedents and to recognize that wise judgments still emerge
through obsolescent language.
184
A footnote in this passage refers the reader to Bernkrant and Babcock v.
Jackson, 85 two choice of law cases in which Justices Traynor and Stan-
ley Fuld, respectively, had used the reasoning advanced by modem
scholars to determine the scope of local policies. 186 This general en-
dorsement of the usefulness of modem scholarship to judges does not
mean that Traynor adopted governmental interest analysis in Bern-
krant. Moreover, while his concluding prediction that "[n]ow that
judges read scholarly works as regularly as scholars read opinions, one
can be sure that Currie's extraordinary insights will absorb many a
judge hitherto baffled by conflicts"' 87 is more direct, it is no less general
in its reference to judges as a group, not merely to himself.
Traynor's review of Currie's Selected Essays was published in the
spring of 1965. On September 7, 1965, Brainerd Currie died at his
home in Durham, North Carolina. 88 Traynor's next comment on the
man and his work was his contribution to the memorial issue to Currie
published by the Duke Law Journal in the winter of 1966.189 The piece
was more an affirmation of the personal friendship the two men had
shared than an additional appraisal of Currie's work. But Traynor re-
184. Traynor, Review, supra note 96, at 435-36 (footnote omitted).
185. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
186. Traynor, Review, supra note 96, at 435 n.36. Traynor's own work had been com-
pared favorably to that of New York judges and his potential influence on the development
of the law had been discussed in December 1962 at the annual meeting of the Association of
American Law Schools. The Round Table on Conflict of Laws focused on the topic, "Mr.
Justice Traynor and Modem Theories of Conflict of Laws." Currie chaired the session, and
Traynor appeared as a guest commentator. Traynor's opinions in Grant and Bernkrant were
compared favorably to two cases decided by the New York Court of Appeals, Kilberg v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961), and Haag v.
Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441,216 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1961), as well as one decided by the
Second Circuit under New York law, Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d
Cir. 1962). Pressing his advantage as Chair, Currie pointedly questioned one of the partici-
pants-Professor Willis Reese, Reporter for the Restatement Second-about what the draft-
ers intended to do with § 390 of the Restatement after Traynor's decision in Grant had
pointed the way to a better approach. The answer would be embodied in § 167: "The law
selected by application of the rule of section 145 [concerning the determination of the appli-
cable law in tort cases] determines whether a claim for damages for a tort survives the death
of the tortfeasor or of the injured person." RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 25, § 167.
See id. Illustration 1 (based on Grant opinion).
187. Traynor, Review, supra note 96, at 436.
188. Brousseau, Brainerd Currie: Pages From the Life of a Gentle Scholar, 28 MERCER L.
REv. 425, 433 (1977).
189. Traynor, In Memoriam, supra note 14.
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ferred to Currie's essays as "original and profound and construc-
tive,"'190 going on to reiterate his judgment of Currie's central
importance to the field of conflict of laws and to repeat his earlier as-
sessment that "every court in the land is in his debt."''
The collaboration between Traynor and Currie ended with Cur-
rie's death. Although Traynor no longer had Currie's assistance in de-
veloping the modem approach to choice of law, he continued to refine
his own analysis, based on considerations of state policy and interest.
Chief Justice Traynor Continues to Refine His Theory:
1966-1970
The Restatement Second Compromise
In 1966, Traynor, who two years before had been elevated to Chief
Justice of the California Supreme Court, 192 was named an Adviser to
the Reporter of the Restatement Second193 Matters on that project had
reached a sensitive point. Ehrenzweig, who had been elected to the
A.L.I. in 1963,194 was not an Adviser to the project, but had opposed
the redrafting effort from the beginning.195 In 1965, after the Council
had rejected his proposal that a special commission of experts be ap-
pointed to re-examine the draft,196 Ehrenzweig published an extraordi-
nary article that added to his scholarly criticisms a candid account of
the gap between the "significant contacts" approach favored by the
drafters and the more flexible analysis that characterized most of mod-
em choice of law scholarship. 197 A token measure to deflect this sort of
190. Id at 9.
191. Id. at 12.
192. Former Governor Edmund G. "Pat" Brown has stated that he takes "great pride
and satisfaction in having... appointed Roger J. Traynor to the highest judicial office in
this State." Brown, 4 Judicial Giant, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1053 (1983).
193. A.L.I., 50TH ANNIVERSARY 146 (1973). Despite the administrative burdens of his
new position as Chief Justice, Traynor maintained his interest in choice of law theory. Ac-
tive in the A.L.I. since his election to membership in 1956, see A.L.I., 34TH ANNUAL MEET-
ING: PROCEEDINGS 567 (1957), Traynor's position as California's Chief Justice qualified
him as an ex-officio member as well, see A.L.I., 42ND ANNUAL MEETING: PROCEEDINGS
533 (1965). In addition, Traynor served on the A.L.I.'s prestigious Council from 1963 to
1980. See supra note 21.
194. A.L.I., 40TH ANNUAL MEETING: PROCEEDINGS 545 (1963).
195. Ehrenzweig, Continued, supra note 23.
196. Ehrenzweig, Last Appeal, supra note 23, at 1231-32.
197. Id. at 1234-44.
The Institute had intended to avail itself of the labors of the foremost scholars.
This attempt was abandoned in the field of conflicts law for both restatements. Not
only did most leading scholars refrain from participating in the First Restatement-
names like Cavers, Cook, Leflar, Lorenzen, Stumberg, and Yntema immediately
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criticism was attempted by the drafters in 1965 with the introduction of
a new section 6, entitled "A Basic Principle of Conffict of Laws." Sec-
tion 6 provided that "[i]n formulating rules of Conffict of Laws, a state
will give consideration to the interests of other states as well as to its
own interests."'' 98
There the matter might have rested, but for Traynor. Reporter
Reese introduced a greatly expanded section 6 at the A.L.I.'s Annual
Meeting in May 1967.199 Reese explained that "the Advisers, and par-
ticularly Chief Justice Traynor, felt that this matter was of some impor-
tance, and that it should be put in black letter form.' '2°° I have
described elsewhere the consequences of this compromise between
come to mind-, but many of them actively opposed its adoption.... In the list
of advisers to the Reporter of the SecondRestatement we miss again such names as
Cavers, Currie, Hancock, Leflar, Rheinstein, Stumberg, von Mehren, and Yntema,
in addition to almost the entire generation of younger scholars. Such argumenta ad
hominem are painful, but they cannot be avoided at this critical stage.
Id at 1237. See also Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant Relationsh p"in the Conflicts Law of
Torts-Law and Reason Versus the Restatement Second, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 700
(1963); Ehrenzweig, Restitution in the Conflict of Laws-Law and Reason Versus the Restate-
ment Second, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1298 (1961).
198. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6, at 16 (Tent. Draft No. 12,
1965). The comment that accompanied § 6 spelled out some of its implications:
Rationale. A state, through either its legislature or its courts, will seek to formulate
Conflict of Laws rules that give fair consideration to the interests of other states as
well as to its own interests. By doing so, a state will in the long run best serve its
own interests. Inevitably, a state's interests will be involved in cases that come
before the courts of other states. All states will profit through the development of
Conflict of Laws rules in each state which require the courts of that state to give
fair consideration in interstate and international cases to the interests of other
states. Development of such Conflict of Laws rules is particularly important
among the constituent states of a single federated nation, such as the United States.
Id. comment a.
199. Section 6 reads as follows:
Choice of Law Principles.
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of
its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the appli-
cable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those
states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 25, § 6.
200. A.L.I., 44TH ANNUAL MEETING: PROCEEDINGS 394-95 (1967).
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what Reese subsequently termed the "approach" 201 of section 6 and the
rules contained in the body of Restatement Second.20 2 So significant a
change in the structure of Restatement Second probably could not have
been accomplished without Traynor's weighty influence.
Reich
Traynor's final choice of law opinion for the California Supreme
Court, Reich v. Purcell,20 3 was handed down on October 30, 1967.
Reich was a wrongful death case. The action arose out of a fatal colli-
sion in Missouri between an automobile driven by Mrs. Reich, an Ohio
resident travelling to California with her two sons, and an automobile
driven by Mr. Purcell, a California resident en route to a vacation in
Illinois. Mrs. Reich and one of her sons were killed. After the acci-
dent, Mr. Reich moved to California with the other boy, and the case
was filed there.
2°4
Reich presented the choice of law question in an unusually clear
way. The parties had stipulated that the damages arising from Mrs.
Reich's death would be set at $55,000, unless the Missouri wrongful
death statute applied.205 In the latter event, the damages would be re-
duced to the statutory maximum of $25,000.206 Neither Ohio nor Cali-
fornia law placed limitations on recovery for wrongful death.
Traynor's opinion treated the case as one in which the forum state,
California, was "disinterested in the only issue in dispute. ' 20 7 The
court's task, then, was to choose between the ostensibly conflicting laws
of Ohio, plaintiff's domicile at the time of the accident, and Missouri,
the place of the accident. The court swiftly concluded that Missouri
201. Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 315 (1972).
202. Kay, Theory Into Practice, supra note 13, at 555-56.
203. 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967).
Traynor subsequently wrote a significant opinion dealing with full faith and credit to
sister-state judgments in the area of interstate child support duties in which he barely re-
frained from disapproving of the United States Supreme Court's inept handling of a similar
problem. See Elkind v. Byck, 68 Cal. 2d 453, 458-60, 439 P.2d 316, 319-21, 67 Cal. Rptr.
404, 407-09 (1968) (distinguishing Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933)). Elkind
did not involve a choice of law question.
204. Reich, 67 Cal. 2d at 552, 432 P.2d at 728, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
205. Id
206. Id.
207. Id. at 556, 432 P.2d at 730, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 34. In order to prevent forum-shopping,
Traynor made his assessment of state interests as of the time of the accident. He explained
that plaintiffs were not then residents of California, and their current domicile in the state
did not provide a basis for California to assert an interest in applying its law. Nor did
defendant's residence provide a local interest, since California had no law that limited dam-
ages. Id at 552-53, 432 P.2d at 728, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
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had no interest in regulating the distribution of wrongful death pro-
ceeds to the estates of non-local decedents. 20 8 Nor was Missouri con-
cerned with limiting the liability of non-resident tortfeasors, especially
those from states with unlimited liability who "would have secured in-
surance, if any, without any such limit in mind."20 9 Having identified
Missouri as a state without an interest in having its law applied, no
obstacle prevented the application of Ohio law. "Under these circum-
stances giving effect to Ohio's interests in affording full recovery to in-
jured parties does not conflict with any substantial interest of
Missouri. . . . Accordingly, the Missouri limitation does not
apply."210
Did Justice Traynor adopt Currie's governmental interest analysis
in Reich? In a later case decided after Traynor had left the court, Jus-
tice Sullivan concluded that Traynor had done so. 211 To support his
view, Sullivan cited the following sentence from Reich: "The forum
must search to find the proper law to apply based upon the interests of
the litigants and the involved states. '212 But Traynor did not cite Cur-
rie's work in support of that sentence. Further, while Currie's Selected
Essays are mentioned twice in the passage in Reich from which the
quoted sentence is taken, they stand for limited points.213
Following this passage in his opinion, Justice Traynor proceeded
to do in the name of the California Supreme Court what he had al-
ready done in his articles:214 he reconceptualized the opinions in Grant
and Emery in terms consistent with interest analysis.215 No citations to
Currie's work appear in this part of Traynor's Reich opinion. Nor is
208. Id. at 556, 432 P.2d at 730-31, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 34-35.
209. Id. at 556, 432 P.2d at 731, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
210. Id. Within this quoted passage, Traynor provided a "cf" citation to his opinion in
Bernkrant. I have elsewhere noted the significance of this reference. See Kay, Comments on
Reich v. Purcell, 15 UCLA L. Rav. 584, 592-93 (1968) ("The citation of Bernkrant v. Fowler
at this point in the opinion seems to indicate a reference to the similar conclusion of that
case that, upon analysis, no true conflict was found to exist between the laws of California
and Nevada. In that case, the court was able to avoid an asserted conflict by giving effect to
the common policy of both states to enforce lawful contracts. In this case, California as
forum has given effect to the policy of Ohio, the only interested state." (citations omitted)).
21 . Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 579, 522 P.2d 666, 669, 114 Cal. Rptr.
106, 109 (1974).
212. Id. at 580 n.2, 522 P.2d at 669 n.2, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 109 n.2 (quoting Reich, 67 Cal.
2d at 553, 432 P.2d at 729, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 33).
213. The first reference is to document the procedural difficulties inherent in using the
traditional approach, and the second is included in a general reference that also mentions
the work of Cavers and Ehrenzweig. See id. at 553-54, 432 P.2d at 729, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
214. See supra notes 100-09 & accompanying text.
215. Reich, 67 Cal. 2d at 554, 432 P.2d at 729-30, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 33-34.
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Currie's article on the disinterested third state2 16 called upon to support
Traynor's characterization of California as a disinterested forum at a
later point in the opinion.217 In his analysis of Missouri's possible in-
terests, Traynor did cite Currie's similar discussion of the interests of
Massachusetts as the place of wrong in the Kilberg case,218 but he did
not endorse Currie's approach in general. In fact, Traynor gave equal
prominence in the final paragraph of the opinion to Cavers, whose
"principles of preference" analysis was cited in support of the conclu-
sion that "[a] defendant cannot reasonably complain when compensa-
tory damages are assessed in accordance with the law of his domicile
and plaintiffs receive no more than they would had they been injured at
home."219 If Currie had been available to comment on Traynor's opin-
ion in Reich, he might have concluded, as he had with regard to Tray-
nor's Bernkrant opinion, that the Reich opinion offered "something to
comfort each of the contending camps but triumphant satisfaction for
none."2
20
The Reaction to Reich
Such an indeterminate conclusion would have found ample sup-
port in the varying assessments of the Reich opinion produced by
twelve contributors to a symposium on the case.221 The scholars agreed
on the proposition that Reich was a landmark case, but on little else. In
particular, they disagreed about what choice of law theory Traynor and
the California Supreme Court had adopted in Reich to replace the
traditional approach.222 Three writers-including, I note with some
chagrin, myself-thought Traynor had adopted Currie's governmental
interest analysis,2 3 while two others viewed the opinion as an applica-
216. Currie, Disinterested, supra note 152.
217. Reich, 67 Cal. 2d at 556, 432 P.2d at 730, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
218. Id. at 556,432 P.2d at 731, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 35 (citing B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS,
supra note 10, at 702).
219. Id (citing D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 153-57 (1965)).
220. Currie, Disinterested, supra note 152, at 758.
221. Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 UCLA L. Rav. 551 (1968). For convenience,
references to the various contributors to this symposium are hereinafter cited by name of
author, Comments, and page number.
222. In Reich, the California Supreme Court "overruled" Loranger v. Nadeau, 215 Cal.
362, 10 P.2d 63 (1932), and Ryan v. North Alaska Salmon Co., 153 Cal. 438, 95 P. 862
(1908). Reich, 67 Cal. 2d at 553, 432 P.2d at 724, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 31. Ehrenzweig argued
that both cases could have been distinguished on their specific facts and issues. Ehrenzweig,
Comments, supra note 221, at 570-72.
223. [D.] Currie, Comments, supra note 221, at 595; Kay, Comments, supra note 221, at
593; Leflar, Comments, supra note 221, at 637.
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tion of Cavers' principles of preference.224 Cavers himself made no
such claim, but he did point out that the implications of Traynor's rea-
soning differed from that of Currie in important respects. 225 One
scholar characterized Reich as Traynor's own mature and developed
policy analysis which had evolved from his dissent in Porter, adding
that it reflected the views of both Currie and Cavers.22 6
Two commentators were less specific. One described Traynor's
reasoning as a "predominant interest" approach similar to the "appro-
priate relation" test used by the Uniform Commercial Code.227 The
other portrayed the approach as a "functional re-analysis" of the choice
of law problem.228 One writer applauded the opinion for "the delicacy
with which the Chief Justice skirts the question of whether he is con-
cerned with 'governmental interests' of the various jurisdictions." 229
Ehrenzweig, in an unusually critical analysis of a Traynor opinion,
charged that "[t]he court has undertaken to fill the gap [i e., that created
by its rejection of the place of wrong] by adopting in language, though
not in fact, the 'interest' teaching of Currie, and in fact, though not in
language, the approaches of the New York Court of Appeals and of the
Restatement (Second) with their 'concerns' and 'significant relation-
ships.' "230 Professor Maurice Rosenberg, who sat with Traynor as an
Adviser to the Reporter of Restatement Second, denied that Traynor
had taken sides in the battle between those Rosenberg termed deri-
sively advocates of "The Method or The Approach" and the drafters of
the new Restatement.
23'
224. Gorman, Comments, supra note 221, at 606-07; Horowitz, Comments, supra note
221, at 634.
225. Cavers, Comments, supra note 221, at 648-50.
226. Scoles, Comments, supra note 221, at 564-65.
227. Cheatham, Comments, supra note 221, at 626-27. See U.C.C. § 1-105 (1978).
228. Weintraub, Comments, supra note 221, at 563.
229. Trautman, Comments, supra note 221, at 623. Trautman went on to observe that
"[t]he current obsession with analysis in terms of governmental interests is usefully ignored
by the court, which again and again speaks not only of state interests (presumably meaning,
in this context, generally held views in a community) but of the interests of the individual
litigants." Id Weintraub, on the contrary, thought that Traynor's reference to the interests
of the litigants was "unnecessary duplication once reference has been made to state interests
in the sense discussed above. The 'interest,' meaning the policy, of any state will be to give
appropriate recognition to the 'legitimate interests of the litigants."' Weintraub, Comments,
supra note 221, at 557.
230. Ehrenzweig, Comments, supra note 221, at 573.
231. Rosenberg, Comments, supra note 221, at 642-43.
What about Chief Justice Traynor, a conflicts sophisticate of unsurpassed discern-
ment? Does he agree with the unruly approach despite his notable role as a lead-
ing mind and voice in the ALI's inner council on Restatements? He does not
explicitly say, one way or the other, in Reich. Understandably, he was concerned
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That Traynor's Reich opinion lent itself to these varying interpre-
tations indicates both the similarity of the competing modem ap-
proaches to choice of law and Traynor's skillful use of diverse theories
in support of his own reasoning. Speaking extemporaneously at the
Round Table on Conflict of Laws held at the meeting of the Associa-
tion of American Law Schools in December 1969, Traynor emphasized
that he saw the task of discerning the policy underlying forum law as
the central problem of choice of law, and that he welcomed all avail-
able academic advice on how to perform that task.
232
In 1970, without having had the opportunity to refine further his
views on choice of law theory in his opinions, and without having com-
mitted the California Supreme Court to an exclusive reliance on a par-
ticular modem approach to the matter, Chief Justice Traynor retired
from the bench. His judicial career had ended, but his scholarly life as
a professor-left behind in 1940 when he joined the court-was about
to begin anew.
The Culmination of Traynor's Choice of Law Theory:
1970-1976
Traynor returned to academic life with an appointment to the
there mainly with deciding the case, not with writing a rule that might apply com-
fortably in other cases. He applied the "interests analysis" to the problem at hand,
but he took careful account of potential variations in its fact-law pattern and inti-
mated that some of them might lead to different results.
Id. at 643. Traynor did not refer to any of the drafts of Restatement Second in his Reich
opinion.
232. Traynor, Conflict of Laws Round Table: The Value of Principled Preferences, 49
TEx. L. REV. 239, 240 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Traynor, Round Table].
Thus the crucial problem to me is one of construction and interpretation. It is
extremely difficult, in many instances, to determine what policy the legislature was
trying to express, or even to determine what policy underlies a judge-made rule.
Once the court comes to the conclusion that the statute was designed to apply not
only to acts, events, and transactions within its territorial limits, but even to similar
acts, events, and transactions having interstate elements, the court must apply the
statute. The same is true with respect to a judge-made rule. The court is immedi-
ately confronted with this question: Is this rule designed to cover situations involv-
ing interstate as well as intrastate elements?
I would be willing to invoke the aid of such tests as which state has the most
substantial connection with the issue, the five principles of Leflar, David Cavers'
preferred principles, and any other principle I could find that would help to deter-
mine whether the statute or judge-made rule at issue applied to a case with inter-
state elements.
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faculty of Hastings College of the Law in 1970.233 Among the courses
he taught during the academic year 1970-1971 was conflict of laws.
234
Here, Traynor as teacher confronted Traynor as judge. His opinions
on choice of law, as well as those in other subfields of conflict of
laws,235 were, and continue to be, included in the major law school
casebooks on the subject 236 and, then and now, attract the interest of
many commentators. 237
The Debate Over Traynor's Work Continues
In 1974, Professor Harold Horowitz decided the time was ripe for
a "restatement" of the emerging California approach to choice of
law. 238 Horowitz's "restatement" was patterned after Professor Cavers'
"principles of preference" and was phrased in terms of policies and
state interests drawn largely from Traynor's opinions in Ford Victoria,
Bernkrant, and Reich.239 Horowitz's analysis encompassed the theories
233. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAW, 93RD ANNUAL
ANNOUNCEMENT 6 (1970-1971).
234. Id. at 44.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 7-9.
236. E.g., R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES-COM-
MENTS--QuESTIONS (1981); W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 163.
237. Two contributors to a symposium honoring Traynor's judicial achievements called
attention to his work in conflict of laws. Ratner, supra note 2; Weintraub, The Emerging
Problems in Judicial Administration of a State-Interest Analysis of Tort Conflict of Laws
Problems, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 877 (1971).
238. Horowitz, Restatement, supra note 2.
239. Id. at 720. The "restatement" reads as follows:
I.
On any issue in a case as to which it appears that there may be a conflict of
state laws, the court should determine, in light of the relationships of the parties
and the transaction to the states involved, those states as to which there is a reason-
able basis for applying their respective policies (ie., laws) to the issue (Le., those
states which have an "interest" in having their respective laws applied).
II.
If only one state has such an interest, there is no conflict of state laws (a "false
conflict"), and that state's law should be applied to the issue.
III.
If more than one state has an interest in the application of its law to the issue
(a "true conflict"), the court should apply that state's law which is determined by
the application of the following principles:
(a) The court should seek a reasonable accommodation of the conflicting
laws' purposes, by applying a standard of "comparative impairment": which
state's policy will be least impaired if it is subordinated?
(b) The court should consider applicable "multistate policies," by, for exam-
ple, inquiring which choice-of-law result will best facilitate multistate transactions.
(c) The court should consider relevant interests of the parties which may sug-
gest that one state's policy, rather than another's, should prevail.
Id. at 723.
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of Currie and Professor William Baxter,240 and, in my view, laid the
basis for the California Supreme Court's subsequent failure to distin-
guish between them.
241
Ehrenzweig, invited to respond to the Horowitz "restatement,"
found it appalling.242 He resisted Horowitz's use of Traynor's opinions
to enshrine Currie's terminology in California law.243 Ehrenzweig dis-
missed the California Supreme Court's use of the concepts of policy
and interest as dicta unnecessary to the holdings in Ford Victoria,
Bernkrant, and Reich.244 This he did without ever once mentioning
Traynor by name. One possible explanation of this omission seems
clear: destruction of the Horowitz thesis required belittling the impor-
tance and authority of Traynor's work. Ehrenzweig did not withhold
his hand from what must have been a distasteful task, but neither did
he exacerbate the situation by personalizing his criticism. Instead, he
cast his conclusion in general terms: "Despite ambitious dicta, these
cases are not only incapable of establishing 'general principles,' but
they are limited in their holdings to the interpretation of three statutes
of narrow import."245 Ehrenzweig concluded his article by noting that
the California Supreme Court had just granted a hearing in a choice of
law case, Hurtado v. Superior Court,246 and expressed the hope that the
case might prove to be a "turning point" in "the fateful confusion
caused by the California courts' academic frolic.
'247
Horowitz's article and Ehrenzweig's response appeared together in
the February 1974 issue of the UCLA LawReview. On May 31, 1974,
the California Supreme Court reached the result in Hurtado that
Ehrenzweig had forecast: the court applied California law to provide
unlimited damages to the Mexican heirs of a Mexican resident killed in
California.248 In doing so, however, the court firmly identified itself as
having adopted the governmental interest approach to choice of law set
240. Id. at 748-58. See Baxter, Choice ofLaw and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv.
1 (1963); see also supra notes 91-95 & accompanying text.
241. Kay, Comparative Impairment, supra note 6, at 583-85.
242. Ehrenzweig, Choice ofLaw in California-A "Prestatement" 21 UCLA L. REV. 781
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Ehrenzweig, Prestatement].
243. Id. at 781 n.1.
244. Id at 784-86.
245. Id. at 783.
246. 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974). See Ehrenzweig, Prestate-
ment, supra note 242, at 796.
247. Ehrenzweig, Prestatement, supra note 242, at 794.
248. Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 581-82, 522 P.2d 666, 670-71, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 106, 110-11 (1974).
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forth in Reich.249 On June 4, 1974, Ehrenzweig died in Berkeley,
California.2 50
Traynor Explicates His Five-Step State Interest Analysis
Traynor spent parts of the academic year 1974-1975 in England,
where he held appointments as Goodhart Visiting Professor of Legal
Science at the University of Cambridge and Honorary Professor of Le-
gal Ethics at the University of Birmingham.251 On February 18, 1975,
he delivered a lecture entitled "War and Peace in the Conflict of Laws"
at King's College, University of London.252 Traynor, the teacher, had
decided to set the record straight about the approach to choice of law
used by Traynor, the judge.
Traynor began by recalling the "Dark Age that was in great meas-
ure sustained by the enshrinement of mechanical concepts in the first
Restatement of Conflict of Laws of the American Law Institute. ' 253 He
recounted the academic attack that had finally discredited the Restate-
ment: "Scholars began to follow the avant-garde of Cook, Lorenzen,
Ehrenzweig, Cavers and Currie against the idol with clay feet and a
wooden head." 254 Then he focused on the different roles of the scholar
and the judge in such times of transition:
When idols are demolished, a judge must work his way out of the
wreckage .... A heavy responsibility attends his new freedom to
evaluate conflicting local policies. He cannot invariably rely on
scholars, who are often better at demolition than at clearing the
ground to open up roads, with appropriate traffic controls, for the
heavy traffic of diverse laws. When there is no clearing, he must
chop his way through, however clumsily, and hope that scholars will
speed their reinforcements for roadways that will bring peaceful co-
existence to warring laws.255
Finally, he spoke of his own experience, acknowledging both his intel-
lectual debt to Currie and his adaptation of Currie's analysis to fit the
needs of California.
256
As Currie had done,257 Traynor set out his "judicial log" in a se-
249. Id. at 579-80, 522 P.2d at 669, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 109. See supra text accompanying
notes 211-13.
250. In Memoriam: Albert 4. Ehrenzweig (1906-74), 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1069 (1974).
251. Traynor, War and Peace, supra note 12, at 121 n.*.
252. Traynor, War and Peace, supra note 12.
253. Id. at 121.
254. Id. at 122. He noted as well the contributions of Chief Justice Stone of the United
States Supreme Court. Id.
255. Id at 122-23.
256. Id. at 123.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 91-95.
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ries of steps that could be used in deciding choice of law cases:
First. The court should apply forum law and not interject a choice-
of-law issue into a case when the parties have not done so.
Second When the parties have presented a choice-of-law issue, the
court should determine at the outset whether the issue is controlled
by a forum statute and, if not, whether it is controlled by a forum
judicial precedent.
Third If the court concludes that a forum statute or judicial prece-
dent does not control the choice-of-law issue, the court should deter-
mine whether the forum's policy for domestic cases should be limited
to such cases or extended to cases with multi-State elements.
Fourth: If the court finds that the forum policy extends to multi-State
cases, it should then determine whether the forum's contacts with the
case are substantial enough to give the forum an interest in applying
that policy.
Ffth: If the court finds that the forum has an interest in applying its
policy, it should ordinarily apply that policy even if it is in head-on
conflict with the policy of another interested State.258
Traynor went on to "elucidate the five basic steps of [his] interest anal-
ysis [and to] illustrate how it has or could have operated in various
judicial decisions, including my own. ' 259 Both in the articulation of the
five steps and in their application to specific cases, Traynor's account of
the choice of law methodology he had worked out differs strikingly
from Currie's 1964 statement,260 and, incidentally, from Horowitz's
"restatement ' 26' as well.
Step I
Traynor's first four steps identify with more precision the judicial
tasks that are implicit in Step 1 of Currie's 1964 Statement,262 and de-
fine with greater care how these tasks should be performed. Traynor's
Step 1 flatly contradicts the initial approach suggested in Horowitz's
Step 1, that the court should identify the states that might have an in-
terest in having their laws applied.263 Relying on California prac-
tice,264 Traynor made clear that the decision whether to rely upon
foreign law should be left to the parties. 265 Traynor's acceptance of the
258. Traynor, War and Peace, supra note 12, at 123.
259. Id. at 127.
260. See supra text accompanying note 166.
261. See supra note 239.
262. Step 1 in Currie's 1964 statement was itself a condensation of the first three steps
contained in his 1958 and 1959 statements.
263. See supra note 239. Traynor did not refer to Horowitz's "Restatement" in his
lecture.
264. Traynor, War and Peace, supra note 12, at 128.
265. Id. at 127-28. "There is no need for a court to make a display of its own diligence
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notion that a choice of law problem should arise only if the parties
create one is consistent with Currie's view that a forum should not dis-
place its own law unless asked to do so by the parties. 266 If such a
stance might increase the use of forum law at the trial court level, Tray-
nor was prepared to defend that result: "There is a beneficent conser-
vation of judicial resources in more ways than one when a court
restrains itself, for it thereby obviates making a ruling on choice-of-law
that could haunt it in later cases. '26
7
Step 2
Once the parties have raised a choice of law issue, Traynor di-
rected the forum court's attention first to its own law. If there is a con-
trolling forum statute or judicial precedent, "the governing forum law
dispels the problem of choice of law. ' 268 His discussion of Step 2 made
clear that if the legislature has enacted a choice of law rule, it will be
by gratuitously interjecting a choice-of-law issue that would divert the parties from the main
issue." Id at 128.
When making a similar point in his review of Currie's Selected Essays, see Traynor,
Review, supra note 96, at 430 n.17, Traynor had used a California case in which he had
participated but for which he had not written the opinion, Lein v. Parkin, 49 Cal. 2d 397,
318 P.2d 1 (1957), as an illustration. Lein arose from an automobile accident that occurred
in New Mexico involving California residents. Assessing the proffered defense that plaintiff
had assumed the risk of injury, Justice Spence, writing for a unanimous court, noted that
"[t]hese issues may be resolved according to California law although the accident occurred
in New Mexico. The trial was conducted as if California law applied and the briefs on
appeal are also predicated on the applicability of California law. We may therefore con-
clude that both plaintiff and defendant have agreed to have the issues determined pursuant
to the law of California." Id at 399, 318 P.2d at 2.
266. Currie, Displacement, supra note 30, at 1027.
267. Traynor, War and Peace, supra note 12, at 128. I once questioned the constitution-
ality of the forum's application of its own law when it found itself to be disinterested. See
Schreter, "Quasi-Community Property" in the Conflict of Laws, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 206, 233
n.172 (1962). Currie responded that he did not share my doubts, noting the United States
Supreme Court's remark in Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S.
532 (1935), that "[p]rimafacie every state is entitled to enforce in its own courts its own
statutes, lawfully enacted." Id. at 547-48. See Currie, Disinterested, supra note 152, at 779.
The subsequent decision in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981), goes far to
bolster the sentence quoted from Alaska Packers, but the plurality reaffirmed the holdings in
Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), and John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates,
299 U.S. 178 (1936), that "if a State has only an insignificant contact with the parties and the
occurrence or transaction, application of its law is unconstitutional." Hague, 449 U.S. at
310-11. A court following Traynor's method will need to guard against what the Hague
plurality went on to call such "extreme examples of selection of forum law." Id. at 311. See,
e.g., Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 677 (3d Cir. 1953), vacated as moot, 347 U.S. 610 (1954)
(concluding that domestic relations are of paramount interest to the state where a person is
domiciled and an attempt by another jurisdiction to affect such relations by granting a di-
vorce is unconstitutional).
268. Traynor, War and Peace, supra note 12, at 131.
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followed. Traynor, noted, however, that "[miore often than not. . . a
court confronts a statute that is silent about its application to matters
that transcend State boundaries." 269 What is the court to do? As if
anticipating the subsequent criticism that proponents of interest analy-
sis falsely claim to be able to identify actual legislative intent as to the
territorial reach of a silent domestic statute,270 Traynor responded that
"the court's task is to arrive at the meaning of the statute that conforms
to the legislative purpose. '271 Traynor listed the source materials for
this research: the statutory language and available extrinsic aids, such
as the context of the statute, its generality or specificity, the care with
which it was drafted, and an analysis of the consequences of competing
interpretations. Specifically excluded was a search for "hidden mean-
ings" not suggested by these sources. 272 Traynor mentioned, as well,
judicial restraint as a guideline for statutory construction.
273
Traynor illustrated his discussion of his Step 2 with an analysis of
Ford Victoria and Bernkrant.274 Both cases involved the potential ap-
plication of a local statute to transactions that had been, in their incep-
tion, entirely foreign to California. In Ford Victoria, a car was bought
and sold on credit in Texas, with Texas law defining the relationship of
the parties and their obligations to each other and to the State of
Texas.275 In Bernkrant, at the time of the original written contract for
the sale of land, the transaction and the parties were all located in Ne-
vada.276 California's factual connection with the transactions in both
cases occurred later. In Ford Victoria, it was when the car was brought
to California in violation of the Texas chattel mortgage and used in
California to transport narcotics in violation of California law. In
Bernkrant, it was when the vendor moved to California, possibly before
the oral modification of the contract had been made, and remained
domiciled in California until his death. Both cases reached the Califor-
269. Id.
270. Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REV.
392 (1980).
271. Traynor, War and Peace, supra note 12, at 131.
272. Id. at 131-32.
273. A court is always on guard against encroaching on the legislative domain and
hence is understandably reluctant to delimit the scope of a statute's general lan-
guage. It will not undertake such a delimitation unless it is compelled to do so
when searching inquiry has made clear that the legislative purpose did not encom-
pass an application of the statute to multi-State cases.
Id at 132.
274. Id at 132-34.
275. For discussion of Ford Victoria, see supra notes 63-76 & accompanying text.
276. For discussion of Bernkrant, see supra notes 136-53 & accompanying text.
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nia courts as a natural consequence of these facts: the errant Ford was
seized by State officials, and a forfeiture proceeding commenced in
California in Ford Victoria, the decedent's estate was probated in Cali-
fornia in Bernkrant. Neither Ford Victoria nor Bernkrant was a case of
forum-shopping. The forum law would have been unfavorable to the
nonresident in both cases.
Traynor's belief that the legislative purposes of the two statutes in
Ford Victoria and Bernkrant would not be served by application of the
statute in either case identifies the perceived unreasonable conse-
quences of a contrary decision as the crucial factor.277 In both cases,
the court concluded that the California legislature would not have ex-
pected parties to transactions unconnected with California in their in-
ception to anticipate the application of California law. As Traynor
indicated in his lecture, this conclusion was relatively easy in Ford Vic-
toria:. "If one State could reach out in such a manner, all States could,
and there would be no end to the legal research incumbent upon a
mortgagee." 278 It was somewhat more difficult in Bernkrant, where un-
certain facts complicated the analysis. There was no finding as to
whether the vendor had been domiciled in California at the time he
made the oral contract with the Nevada domiciliaries regarding land
located in Nevada. If so, California was not totally unconnected with
the transaction. But the relevant time was that of the vendor's death,
not that when the contract was made.279 Traynor's conclusion was not
that the California legislature actually intended the two statutes to be
restricted only to domestic cases. Rather, his conclusion was that the
statutory purpose expressed by the legislature for domestic cases would
not be furthered by applying the statutes to the facts of these multi-
state cases. In other interstate settings, however, a different factual
alignment might produce a different result. Indeed, Traynor had rec-
ognized that possibility in his comments at the Round Table on Con-
277. The purposes were "to diminish the risk that automobiles would be sold to those
who might use them for unlawful transportation of narcotics" in Ford Victoria, see Traynor,
War and Peace, supra note 12, at 133, and to protect estates from "false claims based on
alleged oral contracts to make wills" in Bernkrant, see 55 Cal. 2d at 594, 360 P.2d at 909, 12
Cal. Rptr. at 269.
278. Traynor, War and Peace, supra note 12, at 133.
279. Once it appeared that the contract was valid under the applicable law of Ne-
vada it would have been ironic to invalidate it because the vendor happened to die
in California. The very contract provided that the vendor's promise would become
enforceable only upon his death. There was no agreement that the vendor's prom-
ise would become unenforceable if thereafter he did not choose to live or die in
Nevada. There was no gamble on geography.
Id. at 134.
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flict of Laws in 1969: "There is, however, an element of danger in such
a decision because another case might come along requiring applica-
tion of the California Statute of Frauds, and it would take some whit-
tling to distinguish Bernkrant.
' '280
In his lecture, Traynor presented Ford Victoria and Bernkrant as
examples of "how difficult it can be to arrive at a sound interpretation
of the reach of a statute."' 28' Currie's reading of Bernkrant had been
more sweeping. Indeed, Currie had built a new step of his methodol-
ogy-the moderate and restrained reinterpretation of policy and inter-
est that might avoid a potential conflict between two states-around
Bernkrant.282 Traynor's methodology contains no similar step. His dis-
cussion of the two cases was not inconsistent with Currie's characteriza-
tion, as he noted that the "delimitation of the California statute [in
Ford Victoria] averted conflict between local policy and the Texas pol-
icy of protecting a mortgagee's contractual rights" 283 and observed that
the decision in Bernkrant "sustained Nevada's interest in protecting its
residents and their reasonable expectations growing out of transactions
substantially related to that State, without subordinating any legitimate
interest of California. '2 4 Traynor's analysis does suggest, however,
that he would insist that he was not "reconsidering" California policy
in light of an apparent conflict with that of either Texas or Nevada.
Instead, he was determining whether the California statute controlled
the case.28
5
Traynor's reading of the Ford Victoria and Bernkrant cases goes
far towards refuting the claims of those critics who persist in character-
izing interest analysis as a parochial tool.286 Bernkrant is an illustration
of a considered decision by the forum court not to apply a local statute
280. Traynor, Round Table, supra note 232, at 241.
281. Traynor, War and Peace, supra note 12, at 132.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 154-56, 162-66.
283. Traynor, War and Peace, supra note 12, at 133.
284. Id at 134.
285. Traynor was aware of Currie's alteration of his methodology to take account of
Bernkrant, for he remarked at the 1969 Round Table on Conflict of Laws that "[a]pplying
Currie's original writings, I think [Bernkrant] would have been decided differently." Tray-
nor, Round Table, supra note 232, at 241. Traynor's resolution of the choice of law problem
in Bernkrant, then, must have been a departure from what he thought Currie would have
done. His continued characterization of Bernkrant as an instance of statutory interpretation
after Currie's analysis of the opinion as an example of moderate and restrained reinterpreta-
tion suggests that he deliberately rejected that view of the case.
286. E.g., Ely, Choice ofLaw and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 173, 192-99 (1981); Juenger, Conflict ofLaws: A Critique ofInterest Analysis,
32 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 13 (1984). Cf Rosenberg, The Comeback of Choice-of-Law Rules, 81
COLUM. L. REv. 946, 949 (1981).
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to protect local residents, while Ford Victoria illustrates a disinclination
to increase the state treasury by a modest amount. Neither opinion, in
other words, is subject to the distorted characterization "that a state can
be interested only in helping its own [local residents] by applying its
rules so as to assure that they will win their lawsuits, that consequently
it can have no interest in causing a local to lose his or her case.
'287
If, after performing this analysis under Traynor's Step 2, the fo-
rum court does not believe that the choice of law question is controlled
by a forum statute or judicial precedent, then it should identify what
the forum's policy is for domestic cases, and decide whether that policy
should be limited to domestic cases or extended to the multi-state case.
At this point in his analysis, Traynor appeared willing to take into ac-
count considerations that went beyond those Currie had used. He ob-
served that, in making choice of law decisions, courts should be
concerned with maintaining harmonious relations among the states,
protecting the reasonable expectations of the parties in interstate trans-
actions, and weighing the pros and cons of extending or restricting the
impact of the forum's policy.
288
Step 3
In explaining his Step 3, Traynor stressed what his successors on
the California Supreme Court apparently have forgotten: "If the court
finds that the forum has not yet established a policy on the basic issue,
or that the forum policy is unclear or obsolete, it then has the dual
responsibility of establishing a precedent for domestic cases that may
have immediate multi-State effect."'289 If the domestic policy is to serve
as one source of the multi-state decision, then that policy must be
clearly articulated. Traynor used his opinion in Emery to illustrate this
point. But, perhaps in response to criticism of his reasoning in the
choice of law parts of the Emery opinion,290 Traynor was prepared to
abandon the choice of law rule he had once accepted as pointing to the
family domicile as a connecting factor:
287. Ely, supra note 286, at 196.
288. Traynor, War and Peace, supra note 12, at 134-35. Compare principle (b) of
Horowitz's Step 3 in Horowitz, Restatement, supra note 2, at 723 (quoted supra note 239).
289. Traynor, War and Peace, supra note 12, at 135. See Offshore Rental Co. v. Conti-
nental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 163, 583 P.2d 721, 724, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867, 870 (1978) (assum-
ing, but not deciding, the content of domestic policy); see also Kay, Comparative Impairment,
supra note 6, at 586-90.
290. Traynor's use of a choice of law rule based on family domicile in Emery had been
criticized mildly by Currie, see Currie, Justice Traynor, supra note 1, at 732 n.58, as well as
by others, see, e.g., Weintraub, Comments, supra note 221, at 559-61; [D.] Currie, Comments,
supra note 221, at 598 n.19.
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Although the opinion in this case is my own, and I continue to sub-
scribe to its result, I now have the benefit of enough perspective to
note that I would not today focus on the law of the family domicile
as the only applicable law. . . . [M]uch is to be gained by a shift in
emphasis from the State of domicile, which may not invariably have
an enlightened policy, to an evaluation of competing policies. Given
the California policy against family immunity, for example, that pol-
icy should prevail even if an accident occurs in California and the
family domicile has a contrary policy. California's admonitory and
compensatory policies, intended to cover residents and non-residents
alike with respect to tortious conduct in the State, and its interest in
providing a fund for medical and hospital care in California, would
militate strongly for its policy as the appropriate one, even if it were
not the State of domicile.291
Step 4
Traynor's Step 4 assumed that the court has found that the forum's
domestic policy extends to multi-state cases. The court's next task is to
determine whether the forum's factual contacts with the parties, the
transaction, or the event in question are substantial enough to give it an
interest in applying its law. Unlike Currie's statements292 or
Horowitz's "Restatement,"2 93 Traynor did not expressly build into his
methodological steps a recognition of the false conflict situation where
only one state had an interest in having its law applied. In his discus-
sion of Step 4, however, he made clear that only those factual contacts
that "relate substantially" to state interests are significant.2 94 Traynor
concluded this part of his discussion by referring to his opinion in
Grant, once again identifying it as a case of "no true conflict. '2 95 Ex-
pressing agreement with the result in Babcock, which he characterized
as a false conflict case, Traynor noted that "[in retrospect it is shocking
that it took so many generations to establish a way to achieve prompt
peace whenever there was no true conflict. ' 296 As a final point in his
discussion of his Step 4, Traynor turned to Reich. He defended his
characterization of California as a disinterested third state on the facts
291. Traynor, War and Peace, supra note 12, at 136.
292. See supra text accompanying notes 95, 166.
293. See supra note 239.
294. Traynor, War and Peace, supra note 12, at 137. Traynor favorably compared inter-
est analysis as a method to the "center-of-gravity" approach used briefly in New York, id. at
137-41, relying on Currie's work as he did so, id at 138 nn. 28-29.
295. Id. at 143. It also permitted Traynor to "wish once again that I had invoked the
interest analysis adumbrated in my 1942 dissenting opinion [in Porter], a sleeper in the re-
ports that scholars failed to awaken." Id
296. Id. at 144.
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of that case,297 as well as his decision not to use renvoi to apply the
Ohio choice of law rule pointing to the place of wrong, using instead
Ohio's constitutional provision prohibiting limited damages in wrong-
ful death cases.298
Step 5
In introducing the final step in his "judicial log," Step 5, Traynor
said that the first four steps were "tests that serve to dispel false con-
flicts. '2 99 As I have noted,30° Traynor's methodology contained no ex-
press provision for avoiding "apparent" true conflicts by a more
moderate reinterpretation of potentially conflicting policy or interest.
In his view, conflicts were either true or false. When confronted in
theory301 with "the conflict pure and complicated, the conflict that can-
not be dispelled or abated, the confrontation between the strong legiti-
mate interest of the forum and that of the foreign State,"302 Traynor
embraced Currie's view that the "rational course will ordinarily be to
apply forum law. '303
Currie held to the view that a true conflict case could not be solved
by constructing systems of choice of law rules.304 His use of forum law
to decide the case was a temporary expedient to avoid damage to the
forum's interests while other means of resolving these intractable
problems were explored. 30 5 Traynor added that Currie's "realistic
analysis is borne out by the rational and just outcome it [Ie., applica-
tion of forum law] would lead to in varying fact situations. '306 Traynor
297. Id. at 147. Scoles had questioned this characterization, see Scoles, Comments, supra
note 221, at 567-68, while I had defended it, see Kay, Comments, supra note 221, at 593-94.
298. Traynor, War and Peace, supra note 12, at 148. Ehrenzweig had criticized the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court for its failure "to face the fact that an Ohio court would probably
have applied the Missouri limitation." Ehrenzweig, Comments, supra note 221, at 578.
299. Traynor, War and Peace, supra note 12, at 148.
300. See supra text accompanying notes 281-86.
301. In practice, Traynor as judge never faced a true conflict case. When his successors
on the California Supreme Court identified a true conflict in Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16
Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976), they applied
forum law, but not for the reasons suggested either by Traynor or by Currie. See Kay,
Comparative Impairment, supra note 6, at 582-86.
302. Traynor, War and Peace, supra note 12, at 148.
303. Id
304. Currie, Married Women's Contracts, supra note 30, at 262-63.
305. Id at 263. Juenger thus gives a misleading impression when he says that
"[a]ccording to Currie, the primacy of forum law supplies a simple solution to this seemingly
intractable problem: such 'true conflicts' are resolved by letting forum law prevail." Juenger,
supra note 286, at 12.
306. Traynor, War and Peace, supra note 12, at 148. Traynor proceeded to cite Kell v.
Henderson, 47 Misc. 2d 992, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1965), ar7'd, 26 A.D.2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d
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concluded his lecture setting forth his five-step interest analysis ap-
proach with a warning: "As we now finish one long servitude to cate-
gorical imperatives, we should be on guard against another. We have
had enough of principles that embrace the law with a strangle-
hold. . . . Now there must be a rational evolution of principles that
can survive the storms of change without distortion.
'30 7
Traynor was in residence at Hastings during the academic year
1975-1976, and he taught conflict of laws twice more during that pe-
riod.308 He gave up classroom teaching in 1980, at the age of 80, and
led a quiet and reflective life at home in Berkeley until his death on
May 13, 1983.309 Until the end, he continued to regard choice of law as
a difficult and fascinating problem. It was a problem that had yielded
many of its mysteries to his keen mind and to his creative judicial
leadership.
An Evaluation of Traynor's Choice of Law Theory
Traynor's final articulation of his approach to choice of law drew
heavily on his experience as a judge. Eschewing the scholar's penchant
for abstract reasoning, Traynor saw the choice of law problem embed-
ded concretely in the context of lawsuits to be decided. He was unwill-
ing to create complex decisional problems that had not been raised by
the parties and that might produce-in the absence of adequate re-
search, briefing, and argument by counsel-unsound choice of law pre-
cedent. Traynor understood that "the forum can only apply its own
law" 310 and recognized that while a foreign rule might provide a model
that the forum would follow, it did so only with the forum's consent.
Ever since Currie announced his governmental interest analysis,
552 (1966); Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d
133 (1961); and Lilienthal v. Kaufrnan, 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964), as illustrations.
Through an analysis of Boys v. Chaplin, [1971] A.C. 356; Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563,
267 A.2d 854 (1970); and Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335
N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972), Traynor demonstrated that a party's domicile will not always be suffi-
cient to sustain application of forum law: "The lesson is that domicile must be viewed in the
light of any other factors that enter into an evaluation of competing interests. Though domi-
cile will often prove to be a significant factor, it may sometimes be of little or no relevance."
Traynor, War and Peace, supra note 12, at 154. This point reinforces the lesson drawn ear-
lier from Traynor's discussion of Ford Victoria and Bernkrant, see supra notes 286-87 &
accompanying text, that interest analysis in his hands was no parochial system devoted
solely to the protection of local residents without regard to other forum interests.
307. Traynor, War and Peace, supra note 12, at 155.
308. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAW, 98TH ANNUAL AN-
NOUNCEMENT 35 (1975-1976).
309. Kragen, A Legacy of Accomplishment, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1055, 1058 (1983).
310. Reich, 67 Cal. 2d at 553, 432 P.2d at 729, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
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critics of forum-centered approaches to choice of law have charged,
among other things, that a preference for forum law is not even-
handed; that it is prejudiced in favor of the protection of local people
and their concerns to the detriment of outsiders; and that it impedes the
uniformity of result that makes interstate and international commerce
possible.311 These criticisms are grounded upon an implied standard of
neutrality their proponents claim arises from the uniform application
of an agreed-upon law. But if judges, such as Traynor, perceive as irra-
tional the results produced in litigation by these academic choice of law
systems, no appeal to neutrality can preserve those systems. Modem
critics of interest analysis who yearn for the resurrection of old-style
choice of law rules appear to have forgotten that simplistic, single-fac-
tor rules like the ones contained in the first Restatement did not work in
practice.312 Moreover, the more complex, multi-factor rules like those
offered by the Restatement Second lend themselves to manipulation
and to the incorporation of contradictory approaches. 313
Traynor's refusal in his Porter and Grant opinions to accept the
results produced by the application of neutral principles such as the use
of the forum's statute of limitations or the law of the place of wrong,
respectively, should have served as a warning to those theorists who
believe that rules are so necessary that an occasional indefensible result
should not deter judges from following them. As Traynor later
observed:
I welcome the search of scholars for a priori principles, despite mis-
givings as to those that have thus far been proposed and a long dis-
enchantment with rigid rules that become predictable only for their
irrationality. I continue to view interest analysis as the most rational
approach to conflicts that we now have, and a method that may well
develop principles of its own that will have a long and rational life.
There is sometimes a long wait between improvements, and I would
take my chances with the best that is available rather than with
newly created principles that are advocated primarily for predictabil-
ity, though they carry no guarantee even of that. I am still haunted
by the ghosts of the a priori boundaries where confusion so long
311. For early criticism, see supra note 96. More recent critics, who repeat these earlier
objections as well as adding their own, include, e.g., Brilmayer, supra note 270; Ely, supra
note 286; Juenger, supra note 286; and Kom, Critique, supra note 60. For a response to Ely
and Brilmayer, among others, see Sedler, InterestAnaysis and Forum Preference in the Con-
flict of Laws: A Response to the Wew Critics, 34 MERCER L. REV. 593 (1983).
312. Professor Willis Reese, the Reporter for Restatement Second, admitted this point.
See Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 679,
680 (1963).
313. See Kay, Theory Into Practice, supra note 13, at 558-62. Juenger appears to agree
with this point. See Juenger, supra note 286, at 20.
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reigned supreme.314
It is not parochial for a judge, asked to use a foreign rule rather
than a domestic one as the basis for decision, to examine the content of
local law. The question for the court at that point, as I have said else-
where, is not "whose law is to be applied," but rather "under what
circumstances is a departure from local law justified?" 315 Traynor's
Steps 2 and 3 are an excellent framework for deciding that question.
The place to begin is with an analysis of the purpose of the domestic
rule, for until its domestic purpose is understood, the question of its
application in the multi-state setting cannot be determined. Traynor
saw this job as the most difficult problem the judge must solve. Others
have contended that the problem cannot be solved at all,3 16 or that it
can be solved only by fictional means. 317 These criticisms are exagger-
ated or misplaced. A legal prescription, unlike a declaratory sentence,
is meant to be authoritative: it creates rights and duties; it facilitates or
impedes private or public planning; and it declares the limits on official
or personal conduct. Communication is its aim; compliance is its goal;
enforcement through the exercise of state power is its means. The ra-
tionale for creating such legal prescriptions, one hopes, is to govern
justly. To argue that a law has no discernable purpose is to say that it
is either unenforceable or unjust. It may indeed be difficult to identify
the purpose of a domestic statutory or common law rule, but doing so is
an essential part of the process of government that must be carried out
by all branches of the state, including the judiciary.
Once the purpose of a domestic rule is identified, the additional
task posed by the choice of law problem remains: the judge must de-
cide whether that purpose extends beyond domestic cases. Here a sig-
nificant difference between Traynor's approach and that advocated by
Currie emerges. Traynor's Step 3 continues to focus on the interpreta-
tion of local law, but it takes into account local policies that would be
irrelevant in domestic cases, such as maintaining interstate harmony.
Currie did not examine such policies until an apparent conflict of inter-
ests had emerged, and then only as an aid to reinterpretation of local
policy or interest. Traynor's approach recognizes explicitly that domes-
tic policies include those that enable the state to function within the
context of a federated union of states or a world community of nations.
Only after a judge following Traynor's methodology has deter-
314. Traynor, War and Peace, supra note 12, at 127.
315. Kay, Comparative Impairment, supra note 6, at 617.
316. Juenger, supra note 286, at 33-35.
317. Brilmayer, supra note 270, at 399-402.
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mined that the forum's domestic policy extends to multi-state cases will
the question of whether the forum has an interest in applying that pol-
icy to the case be addressed. Critics have challenged the concept of
state interests, some doubting whether such interests exist at all,
318
others taking them to exist, but to be limited to a selfish concern for
ensuring the victory of local residents over outsiders in litigation.
319
Traynor anticipated the first criticism and made comments that suggest
a reply to the second:
It also bears emphasis that the term State interest is one of objectiv-
ity, not provincial partiality. It connotes no more than a State's inter-
est m carrying out a policy designed to cover those with whose
welfare or supervision it is legitimately concerned. The concept is an
old one in other areas of the law, with a respectable place in the law
reports of countless jurisdictions. Its honourable history counters
those who would debase it to mean identification with the partisan
interest of a State involved in litigation as a party, as in actions by or
against it with respect to contracts it has made, the torts of its agents,
the vindication of its property rights, or the enforcement of its crimi-
nal laws. So narrow a definition ignores the objectivity that is basic
to the judicial process in all litigation, regardless of whether or not it
has multi-State aspects. The judge is not the litigant; his allegiance is
to justice, not to local pride or prejudice.
320
Traynor's focus throughout his first four steps is entirely on forum
law. It is not until the judge has determined the content, interstate
reach, and basis for interstate application of domestic policy that Tray-
nor mentions the policy of "another interested State."'321 Yet he ob-
served that in following his analysis, "a judge must make a painstaking
evaluation of whatever policy is expressed not only in forum law, but
also in the law of any other State involved in the case. ' 322 Presumably,
the judge would repeat Steps 2 through 4 from the perspective of the
state or states whose law had been invoked by a party, just as Currie
suggested should be done in Step 1 of his 1964 statement.323 After the
domestic policies of the identified states are understood, according to
Traynor the forum's policy will ordinarily prevail, "even if it is in
head-on conflict with the policy of another interested State. ' 324 Unlike
his successors on the California Supreme Court who have sought other
318. Juenger, supra note 286, at 35-37.
319. Ely, supra note 286, at 196.
320. Traynor, War and Peace, supra note 12, at 124.
321. Id. at 123.
322. Id. at 124.
323. See supra text accompanying note 166.
324. Traynor, War and Peace, supra note 12, at 123.
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means of resolving true conflict cases, 325 Traynor believed that respect
for coordinate branches of government required that local statutory
policy prevail, once it had been found to apply,326 and that unclear or
obsolete local common law policies be articulated or reformed to meet
current needs in both the domestic and multi-state setting. To charac-
terize this sensitivity to the division of powers among the three
branches of government as following "Currie's parochial idea that
courts in conflicts cases serve as mere instrumentalities of local poli-
cies"'3 27 seems to me to endorse a much more dangerous alternative:
that judges should be unconstrained by local law when deciding cases
involving choice of law.
Conclusion
Working in two different settings-Currie in the classroom, trying
to teach traditional doctrine he increasingly saw as irrational to skepti-
cal students, and Traynor in the courtroom, trying to decide appeals
from trial court decisions he perceived as encrusted with obsolete
dogma-both men came to discover the rationality of examining the
content of assertedly conflicting laws rather than identifying a control-
ling law without regard to its purpose. Their intellectual collaboration
produced a method of analysis that was initially accepted by both
scholars and jurists. Today, academic controversy surrounds Currie's
governmental interest analysis, 328 but its influence continues to be great
among the American judiciary, who use many of its concepts329 even
while expressly declaring that they choose to adopt other ap-
proaches.330 Traynor's careful analysis of the judicial role in develop-
ing choice of law theory remains a vital contribution to the on-going
debate.
Throughout the course of his extraordinary career as a jurist and
an academic, Traynor's probing intellect and persuasive reasoning
transformed the law in many fields. Given his vital contributions to
those aspects of the law that touch directly on the personal lives of
litigants, such as family law, criminal law, and tort law, it would per-
haps be unduly presumptuous for a specialist in the more abstract sub-
325. See supra note 301.
326. Traynor, Round Table, supra note 232, at 242.
327. Juenger, supra note 286, at 822.
328. See supra note 311.
329. See Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law Versus Choice-of-Law Rules: Judicial Method in
Conflicts Torts Cases, 44 TENN. L. Rav. 975 (1977).
330. See Kay, Theory Into Practice, supra note 6, at 585-86.
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ject of conflict of laws to claim that Traynor's most enduring
contributions are those devoted to choice of law theory. In any event,
my own professional relationships with the principal actors in the intel-
lectual history recounted in this Article-as Currie's student and co-
author at Chicago, as Traynor's law clerk on the California Supreme
Court, and as Ehrenzweig's colleague at Berkeley-may have biased
my judgment. Suffice it to end with the observation that Traynor's own
words of appraisal concerning Currie, with only a slight amendment,
aptly describe the significance of his own work in choice of law theory:
"every court [and scholar] in the land is in his debt."

